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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on March 31, 2009
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2009 60(2):303-344; doi:10.1093/bjps/axp011
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© The Author (2009). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

How Science Textbooks Treat Scientific Method: A Philosopher's Perspective

James Blachowicz

Department of Philosophy, Loyola University Chicago, 6525 N. Sheridan Road, Chicago, IL 60626 jblacho{at}luc.edu


  Abstract

This paper examines, from the point of view of a philosopher of science, what it is that introductory science textbooks say and do not say about ‘scientific method’. Seventy introductory texts in a variety of natural and social sciences provided the material for this study. The inadequacy of these textbook accounts is apparent in three general areas: (a) the simple empiricist view of science that tends to predominate; (b) the demarcation between scientific and non-scientific inquiry and (c) the avoidance of controversy—in part the consequence of the tendency toward textbook standardization. Most importantly, this study provides some evidence of the gulf that separates philosophy of science from science instruction, and examines some important aspects of the demarcation between science and non-science—an important issue for philosophers, scientists, and science educators.

1 Scientific Method in Science Textbooks
1.1 Textbook selection
1.2 Topic frequency
Part I: Preliminaries

2 Science versus Non-science
2.1 Subjective experience/bias
2.2 Too many unmeasurable variables
2.3 Non-phenomenal objects
2.4 Falsifiability

3 Scientific Method in Everyday Activities?
4 When Did Science Begin?
4.1 Greek science?
4.2 Seventeenth-century origins
Part II: Components

5 Formal Logic
5.1 Deduction: ‘if–then reasoning’
5.2 Induction

6 Hypotheses, Theories, Laws, Models
6.1 Description and explanation
6.2 Models
6.3 ‘Only a theory’
6.4 Simplicity
Part III: Dynamics

7 The Generation of Hypotheses
8 The Testing of Hypotheses
8.1 Proof/verification/confirmation
8.2 Why is confirmation inconclusive?
8.2.1 Inductive generalization
8.2.2 Alternative hypotheses and the hypothetico-deductive method

8.3 Disproof/falsification
8.4 Why is falsification inconclusive?
8.4.1 Saving a hypothesis through ad hoc exceptions
8.4.2 Revising/correcting a hypothesis


9 Experimental Controls and the ‘Broken Lamp’
10 Conclusion
10.1 Different sciences, different concerns
10.2 Simple empiricism
10.3 The demarcation question
10.4 Textbook standardization and the avoidance of controversy


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