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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access published online on May 21, 2009
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, doi:10.1093/bjps/axp014
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© The Author (2009). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Linguistic Intuitions

Gareth Fitzgerald

University College London, Gower Street, London WC1 6BT, UK garethfitzgeraldster{at}gmail.com


  Abstract

This paper defends an orthodox model of the linguistic intuitions which form a central source of evidence for generative grammars. According to this orthodox conception, linguistic intuitions are the upshot of a system of grammatical competence as it interacts with performance systems for perceiving and articulating language. So conceived, probing speakers’ linguistic intuitions allows us to investigate the competence–performance distinction empirically, so as to determine the grammars that speakers are competent in. This model has been attacked by Michael Devitt in his recent book and a series of papers. In its place, Devitt advances a model of linguistic intuitions whereby they are speakers’ theory-laden judgements about the properties of languages. In this paper, I try to make clear the rationale behind the orthodox model and the inadequacies of Devitt's model.

  1. Introduction
  2. Intuitions as Evidence
    2.1 An example: intuitions about binding
    2.2 Acceptability and interpretability
    2.3 Other evidence

  3. The Orthodox Model: Linguistic Intuitions as Data for Psychological Theories
    3.1 How do intuitions bear on competence theories?
    3.2 Intuitions and judgements
    3.3 Linguistic intuitions and visual impressions
    3.4 Are linguistic intuitions the ‘voice of competence’?
    3.5 Are linguistic intuitions and visual reports disanalogous?

  4. Devitt's Model: Linguistic Intuitions as Theory-laden Judgements
    4.1 Devitt's model
    4.2 Devitt's model and belief-independence
    4.3 Devitt's model and folk theory
    4.4 A modification to Devitt's model
    4.5 Devitt's alternative view of the evidence

  5. Conclusions


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