The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on May 21, 2009
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2009 60(4):679-695; doi:10.1093/bjps/axp017
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Relational Quantum Mechanics and the Determinacy Problem
Department of Philosophy, University of California at San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla CA 92093-0119, USA mattbrown{at}ucsd.edu
| Abstract |
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Carlo Rovelli's relational interpretation of quantum mechanics holds that a system's states or the values of its physical quantities as normally conceived only exist relative to a cut between a system and an observer or measuring instrument. Furthermore, on Rovelli's account, the appearance of determinate observations from pure quantum superpositions happens only relative to the interaction of the system and observer. Jeffrey Barrett ([1999]) has pointed out that certain relational interpretations suffer from what we might call the determinacy problem', but Barrett misclassifies Rovelli's interpretation by lumping it in with Mermin's view, as Rovelli's view is quite different and has resources to escape the particular criticisms that Barrett makes of Mermin's view. Rovelli's interpretation still leaves us with a paradox having to do with the determinacy of measurement outcomes, which can be accepted only if we are willing to give up on certain elements of the absolute view of the world.
- Introduction
- Relational Quantum Mechanics
- Barrett on Relational Interpretations
- A Puzzle about Relative States
- Canonical Cuts
- Is Quantum Consistency Enough?