Skip Navigation



The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access published online on June 23, 2009
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, doi:10.1093/bjps/axp020
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Glynn, L.
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© The Author (2009). Published by Oxford University Press. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Deterministic Chance

Luke Glynn

St. Hugh's College, Oxford, OX2 6LE, UK, luke.glynn{at}philosophy.ox.ac.uk


  Abstract

I argue that there are non-trivial objective chances (that is, objective chances other than 0 and 1) even in deterministic worlds. The argument is straightforward. I observe that there are probabilistic special scientific laws even in deterministic worlds. These laws project non-trivial probabilities for the events that they concern. And these probabilities play the chance role and so should be regarded as chances as opposed, for example, to epistemic probabilities or credences. The supposition of non-trivial deterministic chances might seem to land us in contradiction. The fundamental laws of deterministic worlds project trivial probabilities for the very same events that are assigned non-trivial probabilities by the special scientific laws. I argue that any appearance of tension is dissolved by recognition of the level-relativity of chances. There is therefore no obstacle to accepting non-trivial chance-role-playing deterministic probabilities as genuine chances.

  1. Introduction
  2. Schaffer's Incompatibilist Argument
    2.1 Chance and credence
    2.2 Chance and possibility
    2.3 Chance and laws

  3. Special Scientific Laws
    3.1 Probabilistic special scientific laws in deterministic worlds
    3.2 Lewis's Humean analysis of laws
    3.3 Special scientific laws and the law role

  4. Deterministic Chance
    4.1 Chance and laws again
    4.2 Chance and credence again
    4.3 Chance and possibility again

  5. Chance and Causation
  6. Conclusion
Appendix: Times, Levels, and Chance Setups


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?




Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.