Skip Navigation



The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access published online on June 18, 2009
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, doi:10.1093/bjps/axp022
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Potochnik, A.
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© The Author (2009). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Explanatory Independence and Epistemic Interdependence: A Case Study of the Optimality Approach

Angela Potochnik

Department of Philosophy, 246 Murray Hall, Oklahoma State University Stillwater, OK 74078, USA

angela.potochnik{at}okstate.edu


  Abstract

The value of optimality modeling has long been a source of contention amongst population biologists. Here I present a view of the optimality approach as at once playing a crucial explanatory role and yet also depending on external sources of confirmation. Optimality models are not alone in facing this tension between their explanatory value and their dependence on other approaches; I suspect that the scenario is quite common in science. This investigation of the optimality approach thus serves as a case study, on the basis of which I suggest that there is a widely felt tension in science between explanatory independence and broad epistemic interdependence, and that this tension influences scientific methodology.

  1. Introduction
    1.1 The optimality approach and its detractors
    1.2 The optimality approach and antireductionism

  2. Explanatory Independence
    2.1 Optimality explanations
    2.2 Causal patterns and context of inquiry

  3. Epistemic Interdependence
    3.1 What optimality models overlook
    3.2 Mutual epistemic dependence

  4. Balancing Independence and Interdependence


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?




Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.