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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on August 1, 2009
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2009 60(4):697-720; doi:10.1093/bjps/axp033
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© The Author (2009). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Perfect Symmetries

Richard Healey

Philosophy Department, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721-0027, USA rhealey{at}email.arizona.edu


  Abstract

While empirical symmetries relate situations, theoretical symmetries relate models of a theory we use to represent them. An empirical symmetry is perfect if and only if any two situations it relates share all intrinsic properties. Sometimes one can use a theory to explain an empirical symmetry by showing how it follows from a corresponding theoretical symmetry. The theory then reveals a perfect symmetry. I say what this involves and why it matters, beginning with a puzzle that is resolved by the subsequent analysis. I conclude by pointing to applications and implications of the ideas developed earlier in the paper.

  1. Introduction
  2. Is Faraday in the Same Boat as Galileo?
  3. Empirical Symmetries
  4. Theoretical Symmetries
  5. Explaining Empirical Symmetries
  6. Conclusion
Appendix A
Appendix B


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