The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access published online on August 1, 2009
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, doi:10.1093/bjps/axp033
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Perfect Symmetries
Philosophy Department, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721-0027, USA rhealey{at}email.arizona.edu
| Abstract |
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While empirical symmetries relate situations, theoretical symmetries relate models of a theory we use to represent them. An empirical symmetry is perfect if and only if any two situations it relates share all intrinsic properties. Sometimes one can use a theory to explain an empirical symmetry by showing how it follows from a corresponding theoretical symmetry. The theory then reveals a perfect symmetry. I say what this involves and why it matters, beginning with a puzzle that is resolved by the subsequent analysis. I conclude by pointing to applications and implications of the ideas developed earlier in the paper.
- Introduction
- Is Faraday in the Same Boat as Galileo?
- Empirical Symmetries
- Theoretical Symmetries
- Explaining Empirical Symmetries
- Conclusion
- Appendix A
- Appendix B