The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access published online on August 7, 2009
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, doi:10.1093/bjps/axp035
Images Are Not the Evidence in Neuroimaging
1420 University Hall MC 267, University of Illinois at Chicago, 601 S Morgan St Chicago, IL 60607, USA cvklein{at}uic.edu
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Abstract |
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fMRI promises to uncover the functional structure of the brain. I argue, however, that pictures of ‘brain activity' associated with fMRI experiments are poor evidence for functional claims. These neuroimages present the results of null hypothesis significance tests performed on fMRI data. Significance tests alone cannot provide evidence about the functional structure of causally dense systems, including the brain. Instead, neuroimages should be seen as indicating regions where further data analysis is warranted. This additional analysis rarely involves simple significance testing, and so justified skepticism about neuroimages does not provide reason for skepticism about fMRI more generally.
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Neuroimages Are Statistical Maps
- 3 The Skeptical Argument
- 3.1 Evidence and neuroimages
- 3.2 The problem of causal density
- 3.3 The problem of arbitrary thresholds
- 3.4 The problem of vague alternatives
- 3.2 The problem of causal density
- 4 Skepticism Is Due to NHST
- 5 Neuroimages versus Neuroimaging
- 2 Neuroimages Are Statistical Maps