Skip Navigation


The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access first published online on September 11, 2009
This version published online on September 29, 2009

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, doi:10.1093/bjps/axp038
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow All Versions of this Article:
60/4/765    most recent
axp038v3
axp038v2
axp038v1
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Button, T.
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press [on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science]. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

SAD Computers and Two Versions of the Church–Turing Thesis

Tim Button

Darwin College, Cambridge University CB3 9EU, UK button{at}cantab.net


   Abstract

Recent work on hypercomputation has raised new objections against the Church–Turing Thesis. In this paper, I focus on the challenge posed by a particular kind of hypercomputer, namely, SAD computers. I first consider deterministic and probabilistic barriers to the physical possibility of SAD computation. These suggest several ways to defend a Physical version of the Church–Turing Thesis. I then argue against Hogarth's analogy between non-Turing computability and non-Euclidean geometry, showing that it is a non-sequitur. I conclude that the Effective version of the Church–Turing Thesis is unaffected by SAD computation.

  1. SAD Computability
    1.1 The basic idea of SAD computation
    1.2 Avoiding supertasks
    1.3 Davies's model of SAD computation
    1.4 Hogarth's model of SAD computation
    1.5 Generalizing SAD computers

  2. Physical Computability
    2.1 The Physical Church–Turing Thesis
    2.2 Deterministic barriers to physical computation
    2.3 Probabilistic barriers to physical computation

  3. Effective Computability
    3.1 The Effective Church–Turing Thesis
    3.2 Hogarth's challenge to the Effective Church–Turing Thesis
    3.3 Arguing from SAD computability is a non-sequitur
    3.4 SAD computability is built from finitary computability

  4. Concluding Remarks


There were several errors in formatting in the original version of this paper, which have now been corrected.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?




Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.