© 1990 by British Society for the Philosophy of Science
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Massively Parallel Distributed Processing and a Computationalist Foundation for Cognitive Science1
My purpose in this brief paper is to consider the implications of a radically different computer architecure to some fundamental problems in the foundations of Cognitive Science. More exactly. I wish to consider the ramifications of the Gödel-Minds-Machines controversy of the late 1960s on a dynamically changing computer architecture which, I venture to suggest, is going to revolutionize which functions of the human mind can and cannot be modelled by (non-human) computational automata. I will proceed on the presupposition that the reader is familiar with some of the fundamentals of computational theory and mathematical logic.
1 A version of this paper was read on 31 March 1988 at the 1988 Annual Meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology (Session on Cognitive Science).