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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on May 21, 2007
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2007 58(2):235-262; doi:10.1093/bjps/axm013
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Copyright © The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science.

Saving Unobservable Phenomena

Michela Massimi

Department of Science and Technology Studies, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT UK

m.massimi{at}ucl.ac.uk


  Abstract

In this paper I argue—against van Fraassen's constructive empiricism—that the practice of saving phenomena is much broader than usually thought, and includes unobservable phenomena as well as observable ones. My argument turns on the distinction between data and phenomena: I discuss how unobservable phenomena manifest themselves in data models and how theoretical models able to save them are chosen. I present a paradigmatic case study taken from the history of particle physics to illustrate my argument. The first aim of this paper is to draw attention to the experimental practice of saving unobservable phenomena, which philosophers have overlooked for too long. The second aim is to explore some far-reaching implications this practice may have for the debate on scientific realism and constructive empiricism.

1 Introduction
2 Unobservable Phenomena
2.1 Data and phenomena
2.2 What is a data model?
2.3 Data models and unobservable phenomena

3 Saving Unobservable Phenomena: An Exemplar
4 The October Revolution of 1974: From the J/{psi} to Charmonium
4.1 A new unobservable phenomenon at 3.1 Ge V
4.2 How the charmonium model saved the new unobservable phenomenon
4.2.1 The J/{psi} as a baryon–antibaryon bound state
4.2.2 The J/{psi} as the spin-1 meson of a model with three charmed quarks
4.2.3 The J/{psi} as a charmonium state


5 Concluding Remarks


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