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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2008 59(4):709-731; doi:10.1093/bjps/axn035
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© The Author (2008). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Effects of Moral Cognition on Judgments of Intentionality

Jennifer Nado

Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, 26 Nichol Avenue New Brunswick, NJ 08901, USA

nado{at}philosophy.rutgers.edu


  Abstract

Several recent articles on the concept of intentional action center on experimental findings suggesting that intentionality ascription can be affected by moral factors. I argue that the explanation for these phenomena lies in the workings of a tacit moral judgment mechanism, capable under certain circumstances of altering normal intentionality ascriptions. This view contrasts with that of Knobe ([2006]), who argues that the findings show that the concept of intentional action invokes evaluative notions. I discuss and reject possible objections to the moral mechanism view, and offer arguments supporting the model over Knobe's account on grounds of simplicity and plausibility.

  1. Introduction
  2. The Competence Hypothesis
  3. The Performance Response
  4. Moral Mechanism Interference
  5. Blame or Valence?


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