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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access originally published online on January 19, 2009
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2009 60(1):135-171; doi:10.1093/bjps/axn051
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© The Author (2009). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Newman's Objection

Peter M. Ainsworth

Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method London School of Economics and Political Science Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, UK

P.M.Ainsworth{at}lse.ac.uk


  Abstract

This paper is a review of work on Newman's objection to epistemic structural realism (ESR). In Section 2, a brief statement of ESR is provided. In Section 3, Newman's objection and its recent variants are outlined. In Section 4, two responses that argue that the objection can be evaded by abandoning the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR are considered. In Section 5, three responses that have been put forward specifically to rescue the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR from the modern versions of the objection are discussed. Finally, in Section 6, three responses are considered that are neutral with respect to one's approach to ESR and all argue (in different ways) that the objection can be evaded by introducing the notion that some relations/structures are privileged over others. It is concluded that none of these suggestions is an adequate response to Newman's objection, which therefore remains a serious problem for ESRists.

  1. Introduction
  2. Epistemic Structural Realism
    2.1 Ramsey-sentences and ESR
    2.2 WESR and SESR

  3. The Objection
    3.1 Newman's version
    3.2 Demopoulos and Friedman's and Ketland's versions

  4. Replies that Abandon the Ramsey-Sentence Approach to ESR
    4.1 Redhead's reply
    4.2 French and Ladyman's reply

  5. Replies Designed to Rescue the Ramsey-Sentence Approach
    5.1 Zahar's reply
    5.2 Cruse's reply
    5.3 Melia and Saatsi's reply

  6. Replies that Argue that Some Structures/Relations are Privileged
    6.1 A Carnapian reply
    6.2 Votsis' reply
    6.3 The Merrill/Lewis/Psillos reply

  7. Summary


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