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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2009 60(3):475-486; doi:10.1093/bjps/axp030
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© The Author (2009). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Is There an Independent Principle of Causality in Physics?

John D. Norton

Department of History and Philosophy of Science Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, PA 15260 USA jdnorton+{at}pitt.edu


  Abstract

Mathias Frisch has argued that the requirement that electromagnetic dispersion processes are causal adds empirical content not found in electrodynamic theory. I urge that this attempt to reconstitute a local principle of causality in physics fails. An independent principle is not needed to recover the results of dispersion theory. The use of ‘causality conditions’ proves to be the mere adding of causal labels to an already presumed fact. If instead one seeks a broader, independently formulated grounding for the conditions, that grounding either fails or dissolves into vagueness and ambiguity, as has traditionally been the fate of candidate principles of causality.

  1. Introduction
  2. Scattering in Classical Electrodynamics
  3. Sufficiency of the Physics
  4. Failure of the Principle of Causality Proposed
    4.1 A sometimes principle
    4.2 The conditions of applicability are obscure
    4.3 Effects can come before their causes
    4.4 Vagueness of the relata and of the notion of causal process

  5. Conclusion


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M. Frisch
Causality and Dispersion: A Reply to John Norton
Brit J Philos Sci, September 1, 2009; 60(3): 487 - 495.
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