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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access published online on July 20, 2005
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, doi:10.1093/bjps/axi126
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© The Author (2005). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oupjournals.org

Article

Leibnizian Causation

Michael J. Futch 1*

1 University of Tulsa, Department of Philosophy, 600 S College Avenue, Tulsa, OK 74104, USA

* To whom correspondence should be addressed.
Michael J. Futch, E-mail: michael-futch{at}utulsa.edu


  Abstract

This article examines Leibniz's philosophy of causation with the aim of clarifying how causes are related to their effects. I argue that, much like J. L. Mackie's INUS conditions, Leibnizian causes are members of complex causal conditions. More precisely, Leibniz identifies causes with elements of complex causal conditions, where the complex condition as a whole is sufficient for the effect, and the cause is a necessary part of that condition. This conception of causation is able to incorporate Leibniz's many other definitions of ‘cause’, thereby resolving what appear to be internal inconsistencies in his philosophy of science.

1 Introduction

2 The ingredients of causation

3 Causes and conditions

4 Causes as INUS conditions

5 Conclusion


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