The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access published online on November 8, 2005
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, doi:10.1093/bjps/axi148
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1 Cornell University, Department of Computer Science, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA
* To whom correspondence should be addressed. We propose new definitions of (causal) explanation, using structural equations to model counterfactuals. The definition is based on the notion of actual cause, as defined and motivated in a companion article. Essentially, an explanation is a fact that is not known for certain but, if found to be true, would constitute an actual cause of the fact to be explained, regardless of the agent's initial uncertainty. We show that the definition handles well a number of problematic examples from the literature. 1 Introduction 2 Causal models and the definition of actual causality: a review 2.1 Causal models 2.2 Syntax and semantics 2.3 The definition of cause 3 Explanation: the basic definition 4 Partial explanations and explanatory power 5 The general definition 6 Discussion Appendix: the formal definition of causality
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Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part II: Explanations
2 Department of Computer Science, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA
Joseph Y. Halpern, E-mail: halpern{at}cs.cornell.edu
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J. Y. Halpern and J. Pearl Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part I: Causes Brit J Philos Sci, December 1, 2005; 56(4): 843 - 887. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF] |
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