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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access published online on February 13, 2007
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, doi:10.1093/bjps/axl029
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Copyright © The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Realization, completers, and ceteris paribus laws in psychology

Robert D. Rupert

University of Colorado, Boulder, Department of Philosophy, Campus Box 232, Boulder, CO 80309-0232, USA

Email: robert.rupert{at}colorado.edu


  Abstract

I defend Jerry Fodor's ([1991]) account of the semantics of ceteris paribus laws against an objection raised by Peter Mott ([1992]). In doing so, I clarify certain issues regarding the nature of realization. I argue that not all things that realize a state or property are realizers of that state or property: the relation x realizes y tolerates the inclusion of gratuitous elements in x— elements that play no particular role in the realization of y— whereas the relation x is a realizer of y does not. I then criticize a rejoinder that, in effect, builds such gratuitous elements into the antecedents of the laws of a science of the realized properties.

  1. Fodor's Proposal
  2. Mott's Objection
  3. Conjunctive States, Realization, and Minimal Realization
  4. Mixed Antecedents


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