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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access published online on May 14, 2007
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, doi:10.1093/bjps/axm004
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Copyright © The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science.

Newtonian Forces

Jessica Wilson

Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto

jessica.m.wilson{at}utoronto.ca


  Abstract

Newtonian forces are pushes and pulls, possessing magnitude and direction, that are exerted (in the first instance) by objects, and which cause (in particular) motions. I defend Newtonian forces against the four best reasons for denying or doubting their existence. A running theme in my defense of forces will be the suggestion that Newtonian Mechanics is a special science, and as such has certain prima facie ontological rights and privileges, that may be maintained against various challenges.

1 Introduction
2 Newtonian mechanics ontologically irrelevant?
2.1 ...because superseded in classical contexts?
2.2 ...because only restrictedly applicable?
2.3 ...because incompatible with more fundamental theories?

3 Are forces fictions?
4 Are forces ontologically redundant?
5 Do forces induce causal overdetermination?
5.1 Response: Newtonian forces as aspects
5.2 Response: forces as intermediaries

6 Conclusion


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