The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access published online on May 13, 2007
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, doi:10.1093/bjps/axm010
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Logically EquivalentBut Closer to the Truth
Department of Philosophy, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755, USA
Roy.A.Sorensen{at}Dartmouth.EDU
| Abstract |
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Verisimilitude has the potential to deepen the understanding of mathematical progress, the principle of charity, and the psychology of regret. One obstacle is the widely held belief that two statements can vary in truthlikeness only if they vary in what they entail. This obstacle is removed with four types of counterexamples. The first concerns necessarily coextensive measurements that differ only with respect to their units (specifically length, area, and volume). The second class of counterexamples is composed of mathematical falsehoods. The third class features inconsistent scientific theories. The fourth class of cases features statements that are instructive but meaningless.
- Equivalent measurements with greater verisimilitude
- Verisimilitude in mathematics
- Inconsistent scientific theories
- Meaningless statements