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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access published online on June 5, 2007
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, doi:10.1093/bjps/axm020
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Copyright © The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science.

Constructive Empiricism and the Metaphysics of Modality

Paul Dicken

Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Cambridge, Free School Lane, Cambridge CB2 3RH, UK

ped21{at}cam.ac.uk


  Abstract

James Ladyman ([2000]) argues that constructive empiricism is untenable because it cannot adequately account for modal statements about observability. In this paper, I attempt to resist Ladyman's conclusion, arguing that the constructive empiricist can grant his modal discourse objective, theory-independent truth-conditions, yet without compromising his empiricism.

1 Ladyman's dilemma
2 Constructive empiricism and modal agnosticism
3 Conclusion


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