Skip Navigation



The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access published online on January 26, 2009
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, doi:10.1093/bjps/axn049
This Article
Right arrow Full Text
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow All Versions of this Article:
60/1/101    most recent
axn049v1
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Schurz, G.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© The Author (2009). Published by Oxford University Press. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

When Empirical Success Implies Theoretical Reference: A Structural Correspondence Theorem

Gerhard Schurz

Philosophy Department University of Duesseldorf Universitaetsstrasse 1, Geb. 23.21 D-40225 Duesseldorf, Germany

schurz{at}phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de


  Abstract

Starting from a brief recapitulation of the contemporary debate on scientific realism, this paper argues for the following thesis: Assume a theory T has been empirically successful in a domain of application A, but was superseded later on by a superior theory T*, which was likewise successful in A but has an arbitrarily different theoretical superstructure. Then under natural conditions T contains certain theoretical expressions, which yielded T's empirical success, such that these T-expressions correspond (in A) to certain theoretical expressions of T*, and given T* is true, they refer indirectly to the entities denoted by these expressions of T*. The thesis is first motivated by a study of the phlogiston–oxygen example. Then the thesis is proved in the form of a logical theorem, and illustrated by further examples. The final sections explain how the correspondence theorem justifies scientific realism and work out the advantages of the suggested account.

  1. Introduction: Pessimistic Meta-induction vs. Structural Correspondence
  2. The Case of the Phlogiston Theory
  3. Steps Towards a Systematic Correspondence Theorem
  4. The Correspondence Theorem and Its Ontological Interpretation
  5. Further Historical Applications
  6. Discussion of the Correspondence Theorem: Objections and Replies
  7. Consequences for Scientific Realism and Comparison with Other Positions
    7.1 Comparison with constructive empiricism
    7.2 Major difference from standard scientific realism
    7.3 From minimal realism and correspondence to scientific realism
    7.4 Comparison with particular realistic positions


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?




Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.