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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access published online on February 19, 2009
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, doi:10.1093/bjps/axp003
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© The Author (2009). Published by Oxford University Press. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Scientific Realism, the Atomic Theory, and the Catch-All Hypothesis: Can We Test Fundamental Theories Against All Serious Alternatives?

P. Kyle Stanford

Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of California, Irvine 5100 Social Science Plaza Irvine, CA 92697–5100, USA

stanford{at}uci.edu


  Abstract

Sherri Roush ([2005]) and I ([2001], [2006]) have each argued independently that the most significant challenge to scientific realism arises from our inability to consider the full range of serious alternatives to a given hypothesis we seek to test, but we diverge significantly concerning the range of cases in which this problem becomes acute. Here I argue against Roush's further suggestion that the atomic hypothesis represents a case in which scientific ingenuity has enabled us to overcome the problem, showing how her general strategy is undermined by evidence I have already offered in support of what I have called the ‘problem of unconceived alternatives’. I then go on to show why her strategy will not generally (if ever) allow us to formulate and test exhaustive spaces of hypotheses in cases of fundamental scientific theorizing.

  1. Roush, Stanford, and Unconceived Alternatives
  2. Perrin and Brownian Motion
  3. Retention and Possible Alternatives: New Lessons from Some Familiar History
  4. Whither Exhaustion?
  5. Conclusion


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