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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Advance Access published online on March 2, 2009
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, doi:10.1093/bjps/axp008
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© The Author (2009). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Explanationist Aid for the Theory of Inductive Logic

Michael Huemer

Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309-0232, USA, dqvgudj02{at}sneakemail.com


  Abstract

A central problem facing a probabilistic approach to the problem of induction is the difficulty of sufficiently constraining prior probabilities so as to yield the conclusion that induction is cogent. The Principle of Indifference, according to which alternatives are equiprobable when one has no grounds for preferring one over another, represents one way of addressing this problem; however, the Principle faces the well-known problem that multiple interpretations of it are possible, leading to incompatible conclusions. I propose a partial solution to the latter problem, drawing on the notion of explanatory priority. The resulting synthesis of Bayesian and inference-to-best-explanation approaches affords a principled defense of prior probability distributions that support induction.

  1. A Probabilistic Formulation of the Problem of Induction
  2. A Problem with Objective Bayesianism
    2.1 Intuitive motivation for the Principle of Indifference
    2.2 The inconsistency objection
    2.3 An effort to contain the problem

  3. Explanationist Relief for Objective Bayesianism
    3.1 Explanation and explanatory priority
    3.2 Explanatory priority and the assignment of priors
    3.3 In defense of Laplace
    3.4 The metaphysics of the explanationist defense: causation and laws
    3.5 Inference to the best explanation?

  4. Problems and objections
    4.1 Unknown explanatory possibilities
    4.2 Empirical reasoning about explanatory priority
    4.3 The probability of deterministic laws
    4.4 Changing chances
    4.5 Scruples concerning a priori probability


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