The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science - Advance Access

The Vegetative State and the Science of Consciousness

Shea, N., Bayne, T. — Mon, 08 Feb 2010 13:55:39 PST

Consciousness in experimental subjects is typically inferred from reports and other forms of voluntary behaviour. A wealth of everyday experience confirms that healthy subjects do not ordinarily behave in these ways unless they are conscious. Investigation of consciousness in vegetative state patients has been based on the search for neural evidence that such broad functional capacities are preserved in some vegetative state patients. We call this the standard approach. To date, the results of the standard approach have suggested that some vegetative state patients might indeed be conscious, although they fall short of being demonstrative. The fact that some vegetative state patients show evidence of consciousness according to the standard approach is remarkable, for the standard approach to consciousness is rather conservative, and leaves open the pressing question of how to ascertain whether patients who fail such tests are conscious or not. We argue for a cluster-based ‘natural kind’ methodology that is adequate to that task, both as a replacement for the approach that currently informs research into the presence or absence of consciousness in vegetative state patients and as a methodology for the science of consciousness more generally.

The Decoupled Representation Theory of the Evolution of Cognition--A Critical Assessment

Christensen, W. — Tue, 02 Feb 2010 19:46:44 PST

Sterelny’s Thought in a Hostile World ([2003]) presents a complex, systematically structured theory of the evolution of cognition centered on a concept of decoupled representation. Taking Godfrey-Smith’s ([1996]) analysis of the evolution of behavioral flexibility as a framework, the theory describes increasingly complex grades of representation beginning with simple detection and culminating with decoupled representation, said to be belief-like, and it characterizes selection forces that drive evolutionary transformations in these forms of representation. Sterelny’s ultimate explanatory target is the evolution of human agency. This paper develops a detailed analysis of the main cognitive aspects. It is argued that some of the major claims are not correct: decoupled representation as defined doesn’t capture belief-like representation, and, properly understood, decoupled representation turns out to be ubiquitous among multicellular animals. However, some of the key ideas are right, or along the right lines, and suggestions are made for modifying and expanding the conceptual framework.

Review

Tsou, J. Y. — Fri, 29 Jan 2010 01:27:21 PST

Two Mistakes Regarding the Principal Principle

Meacham, C. J. G. — Mon, 23 Nov 2009 08:02:15 PST

This paper examines two mistakes regarding David Lewis’ Principal Principle that have appeared in the recent literature. These particular mistakes are worth looking at for several reasons: The thoughts that lead to these mistakes are natural ones, the principles that result from these mistakes are untenable, and these mistakes have led to significant misconceptions regarding the role of admissibility and time. After correcting these mistakes, the paper discusses the correct roles of time and admissibility. With these results in hand, the paper concludes by showing that one way of formulating the chance–credence relation has a distinct advantage over its rivals.

Introduction

Background

2.1 The chance function

2.2 The chance–credence relation

2.3 Assumptions

Assessing the First Mistake

3.1 The first mistake

3.2 Motivating the first mistake

3.3 Why the first mistake is problematic

3.4 Consequences of the first mistake

The Role of Admissibility

4.1 Crystal balls

4.2 Usefulness

4.3 The strength of PP₁

4.4 Lewis and admissibility

Assessing the Second Mistake

5.1 The second mistake

5.2 Motivating the second mistake

5.3 Why the second mistake is problematic

5.4 The role of time

Assessing the Chance–Credence Relation

6.1 Take I: Lewis' grounding argument

6.2 Take II: general grounding arguments

6.3 The winner

Non-reductive Physicalism and Degrees of Freedom

Wilson, J. — Fri, 13 Nov 2009 01:10:43 PST

Some claim that Non-reductive Physicalism (NRP) is an unstable position, on grounds that NRP either collapses into reductive physicalism (contra Non-reduction), or expands into emergentism of a robust or ‘strong’ variety (contra Physicalism). I argue that this claim is unfounded, by attention to the notion of a degree of freedom—roughly, an independent parameter needed to characterize an entity as being in a state functionally relevant to its law-governed properties and behavior. I start by distinguishing three relations that may hold between the degrees of freedom needed to characterize certain special science entities, and those needed to characterize (systems consisting of) their composing physical (or physically acceptable) entities; these correspond to what I call ‘reductions’, ‘restrictions’, and ‘eliminations’ in degrees of freedom. I then argue that eliminations in degrees of freedom, in particular—when strictly fewer degrees of freedom are required to characterize certain special science entities than are required to characterize (systems consisting of) their composing physical (or physically acceptable) entities—provide a basis for making sense of how certain special science entities can be both physically acceptable and ontologically irreducible to physical entities.

Introduction

Degrees of Freedom and Special Science Entities

2.1 Degrees of freedom (DOF)

2.2 Reductions, restrictions, and eliminations in DOF

2.2.1 Rigid bodies and molecules

2.2.2 Statistical-mechanical aggregates

2.2.3 Quantum DOF in the classical limit

2.3 e_i-level constraints and e_i-level determination

DOF and Weak Emergence

The Physical Acceptability of Weakly Emergent Entities

4.1 Eliminations in DOF and ‘theory extraction’

4.2 An argument by induction for physical acceptability

The Ontological Irreducibility of Weakly Emergent Entities

5.1 The objection from theoretical deducibility

5.1.1 The response from different DOF

5.2 The objection from causal overdetermination

5.2.1 The response from the proper subset strategy

5.3 The objection from Ockham’s razor

5.3.1 The response from ontological relevance

5.3.2 The response from explanatory relevance

The Limits of Ontological Irreducibility

Concluding Remarks

What Is Right with 'Bayes Net Methods' and What Is Wrong with 'Hunting Causes and Using Them'?

Glymour, C. — Thu, 12 Nov 2009 03:22:13 PST

Nancy Cartwright's recent criticisms of efforts and methods to obtain causal information from sample data using automated search are considered. In addition to reviewing that effort, I argue that almost all of her criticisms are false and rest on misreading, overgeneralization, or neglect of the relevant literature.

Introduction

Cartwright's Claims, and Their Errors

Problems of Causal Inference

Context

Graphical Causal Models and Markov Properties

Interventions, Experiments, and Randomization

Search for Causal Explanations

7.1 The PC algorithm

7.2 The Fast Causal Inference algorithm

7.3 ION and iMAGES

7.4 Build pure clusters and MimBuild

7.5 Measurement error and mixed methods

7.6 Time series

7.7 LiNGAM

Cartwright's Objections Again

Conclusion

Interactive Kinds

Khalidi, M. A. — Mon, 09 Nov 2009 09:09:37 PST

This paper examines the phenomenon of ‘interactive kinds’ first identified by Ian Hacking. An interactive kind is one that is created or significantly modified once a concept of it has been formulated and acted upon in certain ways. Interactive kinds may also ‘loop back’ to influence our concepts and classifications. According to Hacking, interactive kinds are found exclusively in the human domain. After providing a general account of interactive kinds and outlining their philosophical significance, I argue that they are not confined to the human realm, but that they can also occur elsewhere. Hence, I conclude by arguing that interactive kinds pose a challenge to scientific realism about kinds by making it difficult to make a distinction between real and non-real kinds.

Introduction

The Looping Effect

A General Account of Interactive Kinds

Are All Interactive Kinds Human Kinds?

Awareness and Intentional Action

Ontology

Conclusion

The Natures of Selection

Lewens, T. — Thu, 15 Oct 2009 01:07:48 PDT

Elliott Sober and his defenders think of selection, drift, mutation, and migration as distinct evolutionary forces. This paper exposes an ambiguity in Sober's account of the force of selection: sometimes he appears to equate the force of selection with variation in fitness, sometimes with ‘selection for properties’. Sober's own account of fitness as a property analogous to life-expectancy shows how the two conceptions come apart. Cases where there is selection against variance in offspring number also show that selection and drift cannot be distinguished in the way Sober hopes for. These issues have significance beyond the parochial matter of the coherence of Sober's system. There is no good principled answer to the question of which features of a population should count among the contributors to fitness. This means there is no non-arbitrary account of the nature of selection.

Evolutionary Forces

Selection and Drift

Evolutionary and Newtonian Forces

Is Natural Selection a Cause?

An Ambiguity in Sober's Account of Selection: Variation in Fitness versus Selection-for

A Second Problem: The Determinants of Fitness

Conclusion

Churchland's Metamers

Kuehni, R. G., Hardin, C. L. — Sun, 27 Sep 2009 02:05:24 PDT

Paul Churchland proposed a conceptual framework for translating reflectance profiles into a space he takes to be the color qualia space. It allows him to determine color metamers of spectral surface reflectances without reference to the characteristics of visual systems, claiming that the reflectance classes that it specifies correspond to visually determined metamers. We advance several objections to his method, show that a significant number of reflectance profiles are not placed into the space in agreement with the qualia solid, and produce two sets of counterexamples to his claim for metamers.

Introduction

Preliminary Explanations and Objections

2.1 Color spaces and solids

2.2 Visual metamers

2.3 Matching and appearance

2.4 Effect of light on appearance of objects

Churchland's ‘Canonical Approximation’ Hypothesis

Does the CA Cylinder House SSRs in Agreement with the Perceptual Color Solid?

Two Sets of Metameric Counterexamples

5.1 Three metameric grays

5.2 Three metameric yellows

Birds, Bees, and Anthropocentrism Redux

Paracetamol, Poison, and Polio: Why Boorse's Account of Function Fails to Distinguish Health and Disease

Kingma, E. — Mon, 24 Aug 2009 22:34:51 PDT

Christopher Boorse's Bio Statistical Theory (BST) defines health as the absence of disease, and disease as the adverse departure from normal species functioning. This paper presents a two-pronged problem for this account. First I demonstrate that, in order to accurately account for dynamic physiological functions, Boorse's account of normal function needs to be modified to index functions against situations. I then demonstrate that if functions are indexed against situations, the BST can no longer account for diseases that result from specific environmental factors. The BST is impaled on either horn of this dilemma and therefore must be dismissed.

1 A More Sophisticated Version of the BST

1.1 Normal function

1.2 Health as a quantitative normal function

1.3 Dispositional function

1.4 Situation-specific function

1.5 Summary and justification

2 An Inescapable Problem

2.1 Harmful environments and situation-specific diseases

2.2 A detailed example

2.3 Two possible replies refuted

2.4 Conclusion of Section 2

3 Potential Ways out of the Dilemma

3.1 Distinguishing between harmful and normal situations

3.2 First solution: Statistically abnormal environments

3.2.1 Rare non-harmful environments

3.2.2 Harmful non-rare environments

3.3 Second solution: Adverse environments

3.4 Third solution: Non-natural environments

3.5 Interim conclusion and diagnosis

3.6 Abusing the function concept?

4 The BST Refuted

4.1 A central tension

4.2 Differences with previous arguments

4.3 Conclusion

Images Are Not the Evidence in Neuroimaging

Klein, C. — Fri, 07 Aug 2009 09:34:22 PDT

fMRI promises to uncover the functional structure of the brain. I argue, however, that pictures of ‘brain activity' associated with fMRI experiments are poor evidence for functional claims. These neuroimages present the results of null hypothesis significance tests performed on fMRI data. Significance tests alone cannot provide evidence about the functional structure of causally dense systems, including the brain. Instead, neuroimages should be seen as indicating regions where further data analysis is warranted. This additional analysis rarely involves simple significance testing, and so justified skepticism about neuroimages does not provide reason for skepticism about fMRI more generally.

1 Introduction

2 Neuroimages Are Statistical Maps

3 The Skeptical Argument

3.1 Evidence and neuroimages

3.2 The problem of causal density

3.3 The problem of arbitrary thresholds

3.4 The problem of vague alternatives

4 Skepticism Is Due to NHST

5 Neuroimages versus Neuroimaging

EDWIN H.-C. HUNG Beyond Kuhn. Scientific Explanation, Theory Structure, Incommensurability and Physical Necessity

Andersen, H. — Thu, 02 Jul 2009 08:07:40 PDT

Deterministic Chance

Glynn, L. — Tue, 23 Jun 2009 14:18:54 PDT

I argue that there are non-trivial objective chances (that is, objective chances other than 0 and 1) even in deterministic worlds. The argument is straightforward. I observe that there are probabilistic special scientific laws even in deterministic worlds. These laws project non-trivial probabilities for the events that they concern. And these probabilities play the chance role and so should be regarded as chances as opposed, for example, to epistemic probabilities or credences. The supposition of non-trivial deterministic chances might seem to land us in contradiction. The fundamental laws of deterministic worlds project trivial probabilities for the very same events that are assigned non-trivial probabilities by the special scientific laws. I argue that any appearance of tension is dissolved by recognition of the level-relativity of chances. There is therefore no obstacle to accepting non-trivial chance-role-playing deterministic probabilities as genuine chances.

Introduction

Schaffer's Incompatibilist Argument

2.1 Chance and credence

2.2 Chance and possibility

2.3 Chance and laws

Special Scientific Laws

3.1 Probabilistic special scientific laws in deterministic worlds

3.2 Lewis's Humean analysis of laws

3.3 Special scientific laws and the law role

Deterministic Chance

4.1 Chance and laws again

4.2 Chance and credence again

4.3 Chance and possibility again

Chance and Causation

Conclusion

Appendix: Times, Levels, and Chance Setups

BRIAN GARVEY Philosophy of Biology

Stegmann, U. — Thu, 18 Jun 2009 09:23:53 PDT

Explanatory Independence and Epistemic Interdependence: A Case Study of the Optimality Approach

Potochnik, A. — Thu, 18 Jun 2009 09:23:52 PDT

The value of optimality modeling has long been a source of contention amongst population biologists. Here I present a view of the optimality approach as at once playing a crucial explanatory role and yet also depending on external sources of confirmation. Optimality models are not alone in facing this tension between their explanatory value and their dependence on other approaches; I suspect that the scenario is quite common in science. This investigation of the optimality approach thus serves as a case study, on the basis of which I suggest that there is a widely felt tension in science between explanatory independence and broad epistemic interdependence, and that this tension influences scientific methodology.

Introduction

1.1 The optimality approach and its detractors

1.2 The optimality approach and antireductionism

Explanatory Independence

2.1 Optimality explanations

2.2 Causal patterns and context of inquiry

Epistemic Interdependence

3.1 What optimality models overlook

3.2 Mutual epistemic dependence

Balancing Independence and Interdependence

On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical Science

Batterman, R. W. — Wed, 17 Jun 2009 08:39:14 PDT

This paper examines contemporary attempts to explicate the explanatory role of mathematics in the physical sciences. Most such approaches involve developing so-called mapping accounts of the relationships between the physical world and mathematical structures. The paper argues that the use of idealizations in physical theorizing poses serious difficulties for such mapping accounts. A new approach to the applicability of mathematics is proposed.

Introduction

Mathematical Explanations I: Entities

Mathematical Explanations II: Operations

Mapping Accounts: Strengths

Mapping Accounts: Idealizations

5.1 Pincock and matching models

5.2 Bueno, Colyvan, and the inferential conception

Mapping Accounts: Limitations

Suggestions for a New Approach

Conclusion

Linguistic Intuitions

Fitzgerald, G. — Thu, 21 May 2009 06:47:51 PDT

This paper defends an orthodox model of the linguistic intuitions which form a central source of evidence for generative grammars. According to this orthodox conception, linguistic intuitions are the upshot of a system of grammatical competence as it interacts with performance systems for perceiving and articulating language. So conceived, probing speakers’ linguistic intuitions allows us to investigate the competence–performance distinction empirically, so as to determine the grammars that speakers are competent in. This model has been attacked by Michael Devitt in his recent book and a series of papers. In its place, Devitt advances a model of linguistic intuitions whereby they are speakers’ theory-laden judgements about the properties of languages. In this paper, I try to make clear the rationale behind the orthodox model and the inadequacies of Devitt's model.

Introduction

Intuitions as Evidence

2.1 An example: intuitions about binding

2.2 Acceptability and interpretability

2.3 Other evidence

The Orthodox Model: Linguistic Intuitions as Data for Psychological Theories

3.1 How do intuitions bear on competence theories?

3.2 Intuitions and judgements

3.3 Linguistic intuitions and visual impressions

3.4 Are linguistic intuitions the ‘voice of competence’?

3.5 Are linguistic intuitions and visual reports disanalogous?

Devitt's Model: Linguistic Intuitions as Theory-laden Judgements

4.1 Devitt's model

4.2 Devitt's model and belief-independence

4.3 Devitt's model and folk theory

4.4 A modification to Devitt's model

4.5 Devitt's alternative view of the evidence

Conclusions

Antimatter

Baker, D. J., Halvorson, H. — Sun, 01 Mar 2009 01:14:49 PST

The nature of antimatter is examined in the context of algebraic quantum field theory. It is shown that the notion of antimatter is more general than that of antiparticles. Properly speaking, then, antimatter is not matter made up of antiparticles—rather, antiparticles are particles made up of antimatter. We go on to discuss whether the notion of antimatter is itself completely general in quantum field theory. Does the matter–antimatter distinction apply to all field theoretic systems? The answer depends on which of several possible criteria we should impose on the space of physical states.

Introduction

Antiparticles on the Naive Picture

The Incompleteness of the Naive Picture

Group Representation Magic

What Makes the Magic Work?

5.1 Superselection rules

5.2 DHR representations

5.3 Gauge groups and the Doplicher–Roberts reconstruction

A Quite General Notion of Antimatter

Conclusions

Towards a Geometrical Understanding of the CPT Theorem

Greaves, H. — Thu, 19 Feb 2009 06:48:01 PST

The CPT theorem of quantum field theory states that any relativistic (Lorentz-invariant) quantum field theory must also be invariant under CPT, the composition of charge conjugation, parity reversal and time reversal. This paper sketches a puzzle that seems to arise when one puts the existence of this sort of theorem alongside a standard way of thinking about symmetries, according to which spacetime symmetries (at any rate) are associated with features of the spacetime structure. The puzzle is, roughly, that the existence of a CPT theorem seems to show that it is not possible for a well-formulated theory that does not make use of a preferred frame or foliation to make use of a temporal orientation. Since a manifold with only a Lorentzian metric can be temporally orientable—capable of admitting a temporal orientation—this seems to be an odd sort of necessary connection between distinct existences. The paper then suggests a solution to the puzzle: it is suggested that the CPT theorem arises because temporal orientation is unlike other pieces of spacetime structure, in that one cannot represent it by a tensor field. To avoid irrelevant technical details, the discussion is carried out in the setting of classical field theory, using a little-known classical analog of the CPT theorem.

Introduction

The Connection between Dynamical Symmetries and Spacetime Structure

A Puzzle about the CPT Theorem

A Classical PT Theorem

4.1 Bell's theorem

4.2 Auxiliary constraints

Resolution of the Puzzle

Galilean-Invariant Field Theories

6.1 Temporal orientation in Galilean spacetime

6.2 Counterexample to the Galilean PT hypothesis

Conclusions