The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science - Advance Access

EDWIN H.-C. HUNG Beyond Kuhn. Scientific Explanation, Theory Structure, Incommensurability and Physical Necessity

Andersen, H. — 2009-07-02

Does Functional Reduction Need Bridge Laws? A Response to Marras

Morris, K. — 2009-06-30

In his recent article ‘Consciousness and Reduction’, Ausonio Marras argues that functional reduction must appeal to bridge laws and thus does not represent a genuine alternative to Nagelian reduction. In response, I first argue that even if functional reduction must use bridge laws, it still represents a genuine alternative to Nagelian reduction. Further, I argue that Marras does not succeed in showing that functional reduction must use bridge laws.

Introduction

Nagelian Reduction, Functional Reduction, and Bridge Laws

Marras on Functional Reduction

The Logical Space of ‘Bridge Law’ Views of Reduction

[RP] as an Account of Realization

Conclusion

Mathematical Explanation in Science

Baker, A. — 2009-06-30

Does mathematics ever play an explanatory role in science? If so then this opens the way for scientific realists to argue for the existence of mathematical entities using inference to the best explanation. Elsewhere I have argued, using a case study involving the prime-numbered life cycles of periodical cicadas, that there are examples of indispensable mathematical explanations of purely physical phenomena. In this paper I respond to objections to this claim that have been made by various philosophers, and I discuss potential future directions of research for each side in the debate over the existence of abstract mathematical objects.

Introduction: Mathematical Explanation

Indispensability and Explanation

Is the Mathematics Indispensable to the Explanation?

3.1 Object-level arbitrariness

3.2 Concept-level arbitrariness

3.3 Theory-level arbitrariness

Is the Explanandum ‘Purely Physical’?

Is the Mathematics Explanatory in Its Own Right?

Does Inference to the Best Explanation Apply to Mathematics?

6.1 Leng's first argument

6.2 Leng's second argument

6.3 Leng's third argument

Conclusions

A Difference That Makes a Difference: Passing through Dennett's Stalinesque/Orwellian Impasse

Todd, S. J. — 2009-06-23

Dennett and Kinsbourne ([1992]) argue that metacontrast backward visual masking provides a clear illustration that ‘there is really only a verbal difference’ between two versions of the Cartesian Theater model of the mind. This alleged lack of a distinction is both the crucial premise of their main argument against the Cartesian Theater and a motivator for accepting their own Multiple Drafts model. I argue that metacontrast reveals a difference between the two versions of the Cartesian Theater that meets criteria found in (Dennett and Kinsbourne [1992]) for determining such a difference. This difference undermines the soundness of their argument against the Cartesian Theater, and exerts pressure on Dennett and Kinsbourne to offer a more detailed articulation of their model.

Introduction

Brief Explanation of Metacontrast Backward Visual Masking

The Stalinesque and Orwellian Models of Metacontrast

3.1 Criteria for determining a difference

A Difference That Makes a Difference

4.1 Skeptical hypothesis objection

Other Objections and Replies

5.1 Straw person objection

5.2 Corroborative issues objection

6 Conclusion

Deterministic Chance

Glynn, L. — 2009-06-23

I argue that there are non-trivial objective chances (that is, objective chances other than 0 and 1) even in deterministic worlds. The argument is straightforward. I observe that there are probabilistic special scientific laws even in deterministic worlds. These laws project non-trivial probabilities for the events that they concern. And these probabilities play the chance role and so should be regarded as chances as opposed, for example, to epistemic probabilities or credences. The supposition of non-trivial deterministic chances might seem to land us in contradiction. The fundamental laws of deterministic worlds project trivial probabilities for the very same events that are assigned non-trivial probabilities by the special scientific laws. I argue that any appearance of tension is dissolved by recognition of the level-relativity of chances. There is therefore no obstacle to accepting non-trivial chance-role-playing deterministic probabilities as genuine chances.

Introduction

Schaffer's Incompatibilist Argument

2.1 Chance and credence

2.2 Chance and possibility

2.3 Chance and laws

Special Scientific Laws

3.1 Probabilistic special scientific laws in deterministic worlds

3.2 Lewis's Humean analysis of laws

3.3 Special scientific laws and the law role

Deterministic Chance

4.1 Chance and laws again

4.2 Chance and credence again

4.3 Chance and possibility again

Chance and Causation

Conclusion

Appendix: Times, Levels, and Chance Setups

An Explication of the Causal Dimension of Drift

Gildenhuys, P. — 2009-06-22

Among philosophers, controversy over the notion of drift in population genetics is ongoing. This is at least partly because the notion of drift has an ambiguous usage among population geneticists. My goal in this paper is to explicate the causal dimension of drift, to say what causal influences are responsible for the stochasticity in population genetics models. It is commonplace for population genetics to oppose the influence of selection to that of drift, and to consider how the dynamics of populations are altered when each has greater or lesser influence. I define the causes that are referred to as drift when researchers speak this way.

1 Introduction

2 Populations and Variant Types

3 The Cause–Effect Ambiguity of Drift

4 Non-directional Factors in Population Genetics

5 How N_ev Is Used in Population Genetics

6 Causal Conceptions of Drift

6.1 The Millstein/Beatty conception of drift

6.2 Rosenberg and Bouchard: Drift as initial conditions

7 NINPICs

7.1 Why drift is instituted by NINPICs

7.2 How NINPICS work

7.3 NINPICs and random sampling

7.4 Independent sampling and effective population size

7.5 Variance in progeny number

7.6 Population effects of NINPICs

8 NINPICs and the Stochastic Character of Selection Theory

9 Conclusion

Appendix

BRIAN GARVEY Philosophy of Biology

Stegmann, U. — 2009-06-18

Explanatory Independence and Epistemic Interdependence: A Case Study of the Optimality Approach

Potochnik, A. — 2009-06-18

The value of optimality modeling has long been a source of contention amongst population biologists. Here I present a view of the optimality approach as at once playing a crucial explanatory role and yet also depending on external sources of confirmation. Optimality models are not alone in facing this tension between their explanatory value and their dependence on other approaches; I suspect that the scenario is quite common in science. This investigation of the optimality approach thus serves as a case study, on the basis of which I suggest that there is a widely felt tension in science between explanatory independence and broad epistemic interdependence, and that this tension influences scientific methodology.

Introduction

1.1 The optimality approach and its detractors

1.2 The optimality approach and antireductionism

Explanatory Independence

2.1 Optimality explanations

2.2 Causal patterns and context of inquiry

Epistemic Interdependence

3.1 What optimality models overlook

3.2 Mutual epistemic dependence

Balancing Independence and Interdependence

On the Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Empirical Science

Batterman, R. W. — 2009-06-17

This paper examines contemporary attempts to explicate the explanatory role of mathematics in the physical sciences. Most such approaches involve developing so-called mapping accounts of the relationships between the physical world and mathematical structures. The paper argues that the use of idealizations in physical theorizing poses serious difficulties for such mapping accounts. A new approach to the applicability of mathematics is proposed.

Introduction

Mathematical Explanations I: Entities

Mathematical Explanations II: Operations

Mapping Accounts: Strengths

Mapping Accounts: Idealizations

5.1 Pincock and matching models

5.2 Bueno, Colyvan, and the inferential conception

Mapping Accounts: Limitations

Suggestions for a New Approach

Conclusion

Time Reversal in Classical Electromagnetism

Arntzenius, F., Greaves, H. — 2009-06-04

Richard Feynman has claimed that anti-particles are nothing but particles ‘propagating backwards in time’; that time reversing a particle state always turns it into the corresponding anti-particle state. According to standard quantum field theory textbooks this is not so: time reversal does not turn particles into anti-particles. Feynman's view is interesting because, in particular, it suggests a non-standard, and possibly illuminating, interpretation of the CPT theorem. This paper explores a classical analog of Feynman's view, in the context of the recent debate between David Albert and David Malament over time reversal in classical electromagnetism.

Introduction

Time Reversal and the Direction of Time

Classical Electromagnetism: The Story So Far

3.1 The standard textbook view

3.2 Albert's proposal

3.3 Malament's proposal

3.4 Albert revisited

The ‘Feynman’ Proposal

Structuralism: A Third Way?

5.1 Structures: the debate recast

5.2 Relational structures

5.3 Malament and Feynman structures as conventional representors of a relational reality

Conclusions and Open Questions

Relational Quantum Mechanics and the Determinacy Problem

Brown, M. J. — 2009-05-21

Carlo Rovelli's relational interpretation of quantum mechanics holds that a system's states or the values of its physical quantities as normally conceived only exist relative to a cut between a system and an observer or measuring instrument. Furthermore, on Rovelli's account, the appearance of determinate observations from pure quantum superpositions happens only relative to the interaction of the system and observer. Jeffrey Barrett ([1999]) has pointed out that certain relational interpretations suffer from what we might call the ‘determinacy problem', but Barrett misclassifies Rovelli's interpretation by lumping it in with Mermin's view, as Rovelli's view is quite different and has resources to escape the particular criticisms that Barrett makes of Mermin's view. Rovelli's interpretation still leaves us with a paradox having to do with the determinacy of measurement outcomes, which can be accepted only if we are willing to give up on certain elements of the ‘absolute’ view of the world.

Introduction

Relational Quantum Mechanics

Barrett on Relational Interpretations

A Puzzle about Relative States

Canonical Cuts

Is Quantum Consistency Enough?

Chasing Chimeras

Myrvold, W. C. — 2009-05-21

Earman and Ruetsche ([2005]) have cast their gaze upon existing no-go theorems for relativistic modal interpretations, and have found them inconclusive. They suggest that it would be more fruitful to investigate modal interpretations proposed for ‘really relativistic theories,’ that is, algebraic relativistic quantum field theories. They investigate the proposal of (Clifton [2000]), and extend Clifton's result that, for a host of states, his proposal yields no definite observables other than multiples of the identity. This leads Earman and Ruetsche to a suspicion that troubles for modal interpretations of such relativistic theories ‘are due less to the Poincaré invariance of relativistic QFT vs. the Galilean invariance of ordinary nonrelativistic QM than to the infinite number of degrees of freedom of former vs. the finite number of degrees of freedom of the latter’ (pp. 577–8). I am skeptical of this suggestion. Though there are troubles for modal interpretations of relativistic quantum field theory that are due to its being a field theory—that is, due to infinitude of the degrees of freedom—they are not the only troubles faced by modal interpretations of quantum theories set in relativistic spacetime; there are also troubles traceable to relativistic causal structure.

Introduction

Relativity and Causal Structure

The Theorems Purified

Evolving States in a Relativistic Context

Linguistic Intuitions

Fitzgerald, G. — 2009-05-21

This paper defends an orthodox model of the linguistic intuitions which form a central source of evidence for generative grammars. According to this orthodox conception, linguistic intuitions are the upshot of a system of grammatical competence as it interacts with performance systems for perceiving and articulating language. So conceived, probing speakers’ linguistic intuitions allows us to investigate the competence–performance distinction empirically, so as to determine the grammars that speakers are competent in. This model has been attacked by Michael Devitt in his recent book and a series of papers. In its place, Devitt advances a model of linguistic intuitions whereby they are speakers’ theory-laden judgements about the properties of languages. In this paper, I try to make clear the rationale behind the orthodox model and the inadequacies of Devitt's model.

Introduction

Intuitions as Evidence

2.1 An example: intuitions about binding

2.2 Acceptability and interpretability

2.3 Other evidence

The Orthodox Model: Linguistic Intuitions as Data for Psychological Theories

3.1 How do intuitions bear on competence theories?

3.2 Intuitions and judgements

3.3 Linguistic intuitions and visual impressions

3.4 Are linguistic intuitions the ‘voice of competence’?

3.5 Are linguistic intuitions and visual reports disanalogous?

Devitt's Model: Linguistic Intuitions as Theory-laden Judgements

4.1 Devitt's model

4.2 Devitt's model and belief-independence

4.3 Devitt's model and folk theory

4.4 A modification to Devitt's model

4.5 Devitt's alternative view of the evidence

Conclusions

Antimatter

Baker, D. J., Halvorson, H. — 2009-03-01

The nature of antimatter is examined in the context of algebraic quantum field theory. It is shown that the notion of antimatter is more general than that of antiparticles. Properly speaking, then, antimatter is not matter made up of antiparticles—rather, antiparticles are particles made up of antimatter. We go on to discuss whether the notion of antimatter is itself completely general in quantum field theory. Does the matter–antimatter distinction apply to all field theoretic systems? The answer depends on which of several possible criteria we should impose on the space of physical states.

Introduction

Antiparticles on the Naive Picture

The Incompleteness of the Naive Picture

Group Representation Magic

What Makes the Magic Work?

5.1 Superselection rules

5.2 DHR representations

5.3 Gauge groups and the Doplicher–Roberts reconstruction

A Quite General Notion of Antimatter

Conclusions

Commutativity or Holism? A Dilemma for Conditionalizers

Weisberg, J. — 2009-02-28

Conditionalization and Jeffrey Conditionalization cannot simultaneously satisfy two widely held desiderata on rules for empirical learning. The first desideratum is confirmational holism, which says that the evidential import of an experience is always sensitive to our background assumptions. The second desideratum is commutativity, which says that the order in which one acquires evidence shouldn't affect what conclusions one draws, provided the same total evidence is gathered in the end. (Jeffrey) Conditionalization cannot satisfy either of these desiderata without violating the other. This is a surprising problem, and I offer a diagnosis of its source. I argue that (Jeffrey) Conditionalization is inherently anti-holistic in a way that is just exacerbated by the requirement of commutativity. The dilemma is thus a superficial manifestation of (Jeffrey) Conditionalization's fundamentally anti-holistic nature.

1 Introduction

2 Clarifying Commutativity and Holism

3 The Dilemma for Strict Conditionalization

4 The Dilemma for Jeffrey Conditionalization

4.1 Jeffrey conditionalization and commutativity

4.2 The tension with holism

4.3 Loose ends and technical worries

5 Diagnosis

6 Morals and Connections

Towards a Geometrical Understanding of the CPT Theorem

Greaves, H. — 2009-02-19

The CPT theorem of quantum field theory states that any relativistic (Lorentz-invariant) quantum field theory must also be invariant under CPT, the composition of charge conjugation, parity reversal and time reversal. This paper sketches a puzzle that seems to arise when one puts the existence of this sort of theorem alongside a standard way of thinking about symmetries, according to which spacetime symmetries (at any rate) are associated with features of the spacetime structure. The puzzle is, roughly, that the existence of a CPT theorem seems to show that it is not possible for a well-formulated theory that does not make use of a preferred frame or foliation to make use of a temporal orientation. Since a manifold with only a Lorentzian metric can be temporally orientable—capable of admitting a temporal orientation—this seems to be an odd sort of necessary connection between distinct existences. The paper then suggests a solution to the puzzle: it is suggested that the CPT theorem arises because temporal orientation is unlike other pieces of spacetime structure, in that one cannot represent it by a tensor field. To avoid irrelevant technical details, the discussion is carried out in the setting of classical field theory, using a little-known classical analog of the CPT theorem.

Introduction

The Connection between Dynamical Symmetries and Spacetime Structure

A Puzzle about the CPT Theorem

A Classical PT Theorem

4.1 Bell's theorem

4.2 Auxiliary constraints

Resolution of the Puzzle

Galilean-Invariant Field Theories

6.1 Temporal orientation in Galilean spacetime

6.2 Counterexample to the Galilean PT hypothesis

Conclusions

JON WILLIAMSON Bayesian Nets and Causality

Glymour, C. — 2009-02-13

Response to Glymour

Williamson, J. — 2009-02-13

HANNE ANDERSEN, PETER BARKER and XIAN CHEN The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Thagard, P. — 2009-02-03

DOMINIC MURPHY Psychiatry in the Scientific Image

Brown, R. — 2009-01-31

PHILIP MIROWSKI The Effortless Economy of Science?

Ross, D. — 2009-01-19

EVA JABLONBKA and MARION J. LAMB Evolution in Four Dimensions: Genetic, Epigenetic, Behavioral and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life

Grose, J. — 2009-01-15