The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science - current issue

Which Abstraction Principles are Acceptable? Some Limitative Results

Linnebo, O., Uzquiano, G. — 2009-05-20

Neo-Fregean logicism attempts to base mathematics on abstraction principles. Since not all abstraction principles are acceptable, the neo-Fregeans need an account of which ones are. One of the most promising accounts is in terms of the notion of stability; roughly, that an abstraction principle is acceptable just in case it is satisfiable in all domains of sufficiently large cardinality. We present two counterexamples to stability as a sufficient condition for acceptability and argue that these counterexamples can be avoided only by major departures from the existing neo-Fregean programme.

Introduction

A Simple Counterexample

A Fregean Counterexample

The Argument

4.1 Defending step 1

4.2 Defending step 2

4.3 Defending step 3

4.4 Defending step 4

Concluding Remarks

Scientific Realism, the Atomic Theory, and the Catch-All Hypothesis: Can We Test Fundamental Theories Against All Serious Alternatives?

Stanford, P. K. — 2009-05-20

Sherri Roush ([2005]) and I ([2001], [2006]) have each argued independently that the most significant challenge to scientific realism arises from our inability to consider the full range of serious alternatives to a given hypothesis we seek to test, but we diverge significantly concerning the range of cases in which this problem becomes acute. Here I argue against Roush's further suggestion that the atomic hypothesis represents a case in which scientific ingenuity has enabled us to overcome the problem, showing how her general strategy is undermined by evidence I have already offered in support of what I have called the ‘problem of unconceived alternatives’. I then go on to show why her strategy will not generally (if ever) allow us to formulate and test exhaustive spaces of hypotheses in cases of fundamental scientific theorizing.

Roush, Stanford, and Unconceived Alternatives

Perrin and Brownian Motion

Retention and Possible Alternatives: New Lessons from Some Familiar History

Whither Exhaustion?

Conclusion

Scientific Understanding and Synthetic Design

Goodwin, W. — 2009-05-20

One of the indisputable signs of the progress made in organic chemistry over the last two hundred years is the increased ability of chemists to manipulate, control, and design chemical reactions. The technological expertise manifest in contemporary synthetic organic chemistry is, at least in part, due to developments in the theory of organic chemistry. By appealing to a notable chemist's attempts to articulate and codify the heuristics of synthetic design, this paper investigates how understanding theoretical organic chemistry facilitates progress in synthetic organic chemistry. The picture that emerges of how the applications of organic chemistry are grounded in its theory is contrasted with both standard and some more contemporary philosophical accounts of the applications of science.

1 Introduction

2 Total Synthesis as Applied Science

3 Understanding Organic Chemistry

4 The Heuristics of Synthetic Design

5 An Example: Longifolene

6 Conclusion

How Science Textbooks Treat Scientific Method: A Philosopher's Perspective

Blachowicz, J. — 2009-05-20

This paper examines, from the point of view of a philosopher of science, what it is that introductory science textbooks say and do not say about ‘scientific method’. Seventy introductory texts in a variety of natural and social sciences provided the material for this study. The inadequacy of these textbook accounts is apparent in three general areas: (a) the simple empiricist view of science that tends to predominate; (b) the demarcation between scientific and non-scientific inquiry and (c) the avoidance of controversy—in part the consequence of the tendency toward textbook standardization. Most importantly, this study provides some evidence of the gulf that separates philosophy of science from science instruction, and examines some important aspects of the demarcation between science and non-science—an important issue for philosophers, scientists, and science educators.

1 Scientific Method in Science Textbooks

1.1 Textbook selection

1.2 Topic frequency

Part I: Preliminaries

2 Science versus Non-science

2.1 Subjective experience/bias

2.2 Too many unmeasurable variables

2.3 Non-phenomenal objects

2.4 Falsifiability

3 Scientific Method in Everyday Activities?

4 When Did Science Begin?

4.1 Greek science?

4.2 Seventeenth-century origins

Part II: Components

5 Formal Logic

5.1 Deduction: ‘if–then reasoning’

5.2 Induction

6 Hypotheses, Theories, Laws, Models

6.1 Description and explanation

6.2 Models

6.3 ‘Only a theory’

6.4 Simplicity

Part III: Dynamics

7 The Generation of Hypotheses

8 The Testing of Hypotheses

8.1 Proof/verification/confirmation

8.2 Why is confirmation inconclusive?

8.2.1 Inductive generalization

8.2.2 Alternative hypotheses and the hypothetico-deductive method

8.3 Disproof/falsification

8.4 Why is falsification inconclusive?

8.4.1 Saving a hypothesis through ad hoc exceptions

8.4.2 Revising/correcting a hypothesis

9 Experimental Controls and the ‘Broken Lamp’

10 Conclusion

10.1 Different sciences, different concerns

10.2 Simple empiricism

10.3 The demarcation question

10.4 Textbook standardization and the avoidance of controversy

Explanationist Aid for the Theory of Inductive Logic

Huemer, M. — 2009-05-20

A central problem facing a probabilistic approach to the problem of induction is the difficulty of sufficiently constraining prior probabilities so as to yield the conclusion that induction is cogent. The Principle of Indifference, according to which alternatives are equiprobable when one has no grounds for preferring one over another, represents one way of addressing this problem; however, the Principle faces the well-known problem that multiple interpretations of it are possible, leading to incompatible conclusions. I propose a partial solution to the latter problem, drawing on the notion of explanatory priority. The resulting synthesis of Bayesian and inference-to-best-explanation approaches affords a principled defense of prior probability distributions that support induction.

A Probabilistic Formulation of the Problem of Induction

A Problem with Objective Bayesianism

2.1 Intuitive motivation for the Principle of Indifference

2.2 The inconsistency objection

2.3 An effort to contain the problem

Explanationist Relief for Objective Bayesianism

3.1 Explanation and explanatory priority

3.2 Explanatory priority and the assignment of priors

3.3 In defense of Laplace

3.4 The metaphysics of the explanationist defense: causation and laws

3.5 Inference to the best explanation?

Problems and objections

4.1 Unknown explanatory possibilities

4.2 Empirical reasoning about explanatory priority

4.3 The probability of deterministic laws

4.4 Changing chances

4.5 Scruples concerning a priori probability

Cognitive Maps and the Language of Thought

Rescorla, M. — 2009-05-20

Fodor advocates a view of cognitive processes as computations defined over the language of thought (or Mentalese). Even among those who endorse Mentalese, considerable controversy surrounds its representational format. What semantically relevant structure should scientific psychology attribute to Mentalese symbols? Researchers commonly emphasize logical structure, akin to that displayed by predicate calculus sentences. To counteract this tendency, I discuss computational models of navigation drawn from probabilistic robotics. These models involve computations defined over cognitive maps, which have geometric rather than logical structure. They thereby demonstrate the possibility of rational cognitive processes in an exclusively non-logical representational medium. Furthermore, they offer much promise for the empirical study of animal navigation.

Mental Representations

Mental Imagery, Perception, and Cognitive Maps

Cognitive Maps in Psychology

Cognitive Maps in Robotics

Cognitive Maps in the Strict Sense?

Logically Structured Representations?

Systematicity and Productivity

Consequences for Philosophy and Psychology

Appendix: Cartographic Semantics

Gene Names as Proper Names of Individuals: An Assessment

Reydon, T. A. C. — 2009-05-20

According to a recent suggestion, the names of gene taxa should be conceived of as referring to individuals with concrete genes as their parts, just as the names of biological species are often understood as denoting individuals with organisms as their parts. Although prima facie this suggestion might advance the debate on gene concepts in a similar way as the species-are-individuals thesis advanced the debate on species concepts, I argue that the principal arguments in support of the gene-individuality thesis are much less compelling than the parallel arguments in the species case. In addition, I argue that the notion of biological function invoked in the gene-individuality thesis (selected effect) is not the one that biologists actually use when individuating genes. Contra the gene-individuality thesis, I argue that gene names refer to kinds, defined primarily (though not exclusively) by causal-role functions.

1 Introduction

2 Species as Individuals: The Two Main Arguments

3 Gene-Lineages as Individuals: Rosenberg's Argumentation

4 Assessing the GAI-Thesis

4.1 Metaphysics: What biology tells us about lineages

4.2 Epistemology: How biologists individuate the parts of genomes

5 What Do Gene Names Refer To?

6 Why the GAI-thesis Won't Solve the Gene Problem

VINCENT F. HENDRICKS Mainstream and Formal Epistemology

Priest, G. — 2009-05-20

ROBIN LE POIDEVIN The Images of Time: An Essay on Temporal Representation

Phillips, I. B. — 2009-05-20

C. S. BERTUGLIA AND F. VAIO Nonlinearity, Chaos, and Complexity

Strevens, M. — 2009-05-20

JOHN FOSTER The Divine Lawmaker

Beebee, H. — 2009-05-20