The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science - recent issues

Generous or Parsimonious Cognitive Architecture? Cognitive Neuroscience and Theory of Mind

Gerrans, P., Stone, V. E. — 2008-05-24

Recent work in cognitive neuroscience on the child's Theory of Mind (ToM) has pursued the idea that the ability to metarepresent mental states depends on a domain-specific cognitive subystem implemented in specific neural circuitry: a Theory of Mind Module. We argue that the interaction of several domain-general mechanisms and lower-level domain-specific mechanisms accounts for the flexibility and sophistication of behavior, which has been taken to be evidence for a domain-specific ToM module. This finding is of more general interest since it suggests a parsimonious cognitive architecture can account for apparent domain specificity. We argue for such an architecture in two stages. First, on conceptual grounds, contrasting the case of language with ToM, and second, by showing that recent evidence in the form of fMRI and lesion studies supports the more parsimonious hypothesis.

Theory of Mind, Metarepresentation, and Modularity

Developmental Components of ToM

The Analogy with Modularity of Language

Dissociations without Modules

The Evidence from Neuroscience

Conclusion

A Puzzle about Laws, Symmetries and Measurability

Roberts, J. T. — 2008-05-24

I describe a problem about the relations among symmetries, laws and measurable quantities. I explain why several ways of trying to solve it will not work, and I sketch a solution that might work. I discuss this problem in the context of Newtonian theories, but it also arises for many other physical theories. The problem is that there are two ways of defining the space-time symmetries of a physical theory: as its dynamical symmetries or as its empirical symmetries. The two definitions are not equivalent, yet they pick out the same extension. This coincidence cries out for explanation, and it is not clear what the explanation could be.

The Puzzle: Symmetries, Measurability and Invariance

1.1 The symmetries and the measurable quantities of Newtonian mechanics

1.2 The puzzle

Two Easy Answers

Another Unsuccessful Solution: Appeal to Geometrical Symmetries

Locating the Puzzle

The Relation between Laws and Measurability

A Possible Solution

Countering Kauffman with Connectionism: Two Views of Gene Regulation and the Fundamental Nature of Ontogeny

Sansom, R. — 2008-05-24

Understanding the operation and evolution of gene regulation networks is critical to understanding ontogeny and evolution. According to Stuart Kauffman's view, (1) each cell type cycles through its own repeated pattern of gene expression, (2) the order of ontogeny is dependent on these cycles being short, and (3) evolution is possible because these cycles mutate gradually. This view of gene regulation reflects Kauffman's view that ontogeny is fundamentally the process of cells repeating cycles of activity. I criticize Kauffman's view of gene regulation networks and offer the connectionist theory of gene regulation as an alternative. On this view, the generic order of gene regulation mechanisms is due to the qualitatively consistent way that one gene product influences the expression of another. This allows networks to be stable and evolve to regulate accurately, allowing cells to react appropriately to their microenvironments, due to design by natural selection.

Introduction

Kauffman's Model of Gene Regulation

Explaining the Order of Kauffman's K = 2 Networks

The Importance and Relevance of Kauffman's Explanations of the Order of Gene Regulation

Additional Orderly Facts of Transcription

The Order of Network Accuracy

The Accuracy of Connectionist Networks

The Evolvability of Gene Regulation Networks

Laws of Structure

Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: A Reply to Huber [2005]

Crupi, V., Festa, R., Mastropasqua, T. — 2008-05-24

Bayesian epistemology postulates a probabilistic analysis of many sorts of ordinary and scientific reasoning. Huber ([2005]) has provided a novel criticism of Bayesianism, whose core argument involves a challenging issue: confirmation by uncertain evidence. In this paper, we argue that under a properly defined Bayesian account of confirmation by uncertain evidence, Huber's criticism fails. By contrast, our discussion will highlight what we take as some new and appealing features of Bayesian confirmation theory.

Introduction

Uncertain Evidence and Bayesian Confirmation

Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence: Test Cases and Basic Principles

Reply to Crupi et al.'s 'Bayesian Confirmation by Uncertain Evidence' ([2008])

Huber, F. — 2008-05-24

Can Classical Structures Explain Quantum Phenomena?

Bokulich, A. — 2008-05-24

In semiclassical mechanics one finds explanations of quantum phenomena that appeal to classical structures. These explanations are prima facie problematic insofar as the classical structures they appeal to do not exist. Here I defend the view that fictional structures can be genuinely explanatory by introducing a model-based account of scientific explanation. Applying this framework to the semiclassical phenomenon of wavefunction scarring, I argue that not only can the fictional classical trajectories explain certain aspects of this quantum phenomenon, but also that an explanation that does not make reference to these classical structures is, in a certain sense, deficient.

Introduction

The Case of Wavefunction Scarring

Model Explanations, or How Fictional Structures Can Explain

Putting Understanding Back into Explanation

Fertility and Scientific Realism

Segall, R. — 2008-05-24

It has been claimed that modern long-standing scientific theories are fertile, in the sense of having been progressively successfully modified to meet new experimental observations or theoretical developments in related areas, and that these modifications arise naturally from each preceding version of the theory. McMullin has advanced this form of fertility as a vindication of scientific realism, since if the theories did not approximate the real, the observation would be inexplicable. In response Nolan has denied the existence of fertility in this sense as an independent virtue. The present paper argues that the rebuttal is flawed.

Introduction

McMullin's P-fertility

Fertility Explained Away as Novel Prediction

Conclusion

Francesco Guala The Methodology of Experimental Economics

Ross, D. — 2008-05-24

Andreas Huttemann What's Wrong With Microphysicalism?

Schaffer, J. — 2008-05-24

De Finetti, Countable Additivity, Consistency and Coherence

Howson, C. — 2008-03-26

Many people believe that there is a Dutch Book argument establishing that the principle of countable additivity is a condition of coherence. De Finetti himself did not, but for reasons that are at first sight perplexing. I show that he rejected countable additivity, and hence the Dutch Book argument for it, because countable additivity conflicted with intuitive principles about the scope of authentic consistency constraints. These he often claimed were logical in nature, but he never attempted to relate this idea to deductive logic and its own concept of consistency. This I do, showing that at one level the definitions of deductive and probabilistic consistency are identical, differing only in the nature of the constraints imposed. In the probabilistic case I believe that R.T. Cox's ‘scale-free’ axioms for subjective probability are the most suitable candidates.

1 Introduction

2 Coherence and Consistency

3 The Infinite Fair Lottery

4 The Puzzle Resolved—But Replaced by Another

5 Countable Additivity, Conglomerability and Dutch Books

6 The Probability Axioms and Cox's Theorem

7 Truth and Probability

8 Conclusion: ‘Logical Omniscience’

Varieties of Population Structure and the Levels of Selection

Godfrey-Smith, P. — 2008-03-26

Group-structured populations, of the kind prominent in discussions of multilevel selection, are contrasted with ‘neighbor-structured’ populations. I argue that it is a necessary condition on multilevel description of a selection process that there should be a nonarbitrary division of the population into equivalence classes (or an approximation to this situation). The discussion is focused via comparisons between two famous problem cases involving group structure (altruism and heterozygote advantage) and two neighbor-structured cases that resemble them. Conclusions are also drawn about the role of correlated interaction in the evolution of altruism.

1 Introduction

2 Two Kinds of Population Structure

3 Objections and Replies

4 Particles on a Line

5 Conclusion

Appendix: Neighborhoods and Selection

The Somatic Marker Hypotheses, and What the Iowa Gambling Task Does and Does not Show

Colombetti, G. — 2008-03-26

Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) is a prominent neuroscientific hypothesis about the mechanisms implementing decision-making. This paper argues that, since its inception, the SMH has not been clearly formulated. It is possible to identify at least two different hypotheses, which make different predictions: SMH-G, which claims that somatic states generally implement preferences and are needed to make a decision; and SMH-S, which specifically claims that somatic states assist decision-making by anticipating the long-term outcomes of available options. This paper also argues that neither hypothesis is adequately supported empirically; the task originally proposed to test SMH is not a good test for SMH-S, and its results do not support SMH-G either. In addition, it is not clear how SMH-G could be empirically invalidated, given its general formulation. Suggestions are made that could help provide evidence for SMH-S, and make SMH-G more specific.

1 Introduction

2 Two Hypotheses: Somatic Markers as Embodied Preferences, and as a Source of Farsightedness

3 Lack of Evidence for Somatic Farsightedness

4 Does Making Decisions Require Somatic Markers, and can it be Shown in the Laboratory?

5 Conclusion

The One World, One Science Argument

Kukla, A. — 2008-03-26

The one world, one science argument (so named by Rescher) is advanced by Carl Sagan and others to support the thesis that we will be able to learn to converse with intelligent extraterrestrials if and when we encounter them. The prima facie obstacle to extraterrestrial communication is that the aliens’ culture and geography are bound to be so different from ours that we would find it extremely difficult, if not practically impossible, to find a common topic on which we can both converse. Sagan's rebuttal is that we will share mathematics and the laws of physics, these being the same for all intelligent beings regardless of local cultural and geographical variations. I show that this argument fails even if its contentious assumptions about science and the world are granted—that is to say, it fails on uncontentious grounds.

1 OWOS

2 OWOS and Social Constructivism

3 OWOS and Conceptual Relativism

4 OWOS and the Selection Problem

5 The Fundamental Laws Solution

6 The Mathematics Solution

7 The Radio Solution

8 The Common Conditions Solution

9 The Intractability of the Selection Problem

10 The Superfluity of OWOS

What Evidence Do You Have?

Neta, R. — 2008-03-26

Your evidence constrains your rational degrees of confidence both locally and globally. On the one hand, particular bits of evidence can boost or diminish your rational degree of confidence in various hypotheses, relative to your background information. On the other hand, epistemic rationality requires that, for any hypothesis h, your confidence in h is proportional to the support that h receives from your total evidence. Why is it that your evidence has these two epistemic powers? I argue that various proposed accounts of what it is for something to be an element of your evidence set cannot answer this question. I then propose an alternative account of what it is for something to be an element of your evidence set.

1 Introduction

2 The elements of one's evidence set are propositions

3 Which kinds of propositions are in one's evidence set?

3.1 Doxastic accounts of evidence

3.2 Non-doxastic accounts of evidence

4 Elaborating and defending the LIE

Meta-scientific Eliminativism: A Reconsideration of Chomsky's Review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior

Collins, J. — 2007-11-22

The paper considers our ordinary mentalistic discourse in relation to what we should expect from any genuine science of the mind. A meta-scientific eliminativism is commended and distinguished from the more familiar eliminativism of Skinner and the Churchlands. Meta-scientific eliminativism views folk psychology qua folksy as unsuited to offer insight into the structure of cognition, although it might otherwise be indispensable for our social commerce and self-understanding. This position flows from a general thesis that scientific advance is marked by an eschewal of folk understanding. The latter half of the paper argues that, contrary to the received view, Chomsky's review of Skinner offers not just an argument against Skinner's eliminativism, but, more centrally, one in favour of the second eliminativism.

1 Introduction

2 Preliminaries: What Meta-scientific Eliminativism is Not

3 Meta-scientific Eliminativism

3.1 Folk psychology and cognitive science

4 Two Readings of Chomsky's Review of Skinner

5 Issues of Interpretation

5.1 A grammar as a theory

5.2 Cartesian linguistics

5.3 Common cause

6 Chomsky's Current View

Causation and Its Relation to 'Causal Laws'

Smith, S. R. — 2007-11-22

Many have found attractive views according to which the veracity of specific causal judgements is underwritten by general causal laws. This paper describes various variants of that view and explores complications that appear when one looks at a certain simple type of example from physics. To capture certain causal dependencies, physics is driven to look at equations which, I argue, are not causal laws. One place where physics is forced to look at such equations (and not the only place) is in its handling of Green's functions which reveal point-wise causal dependencies. Thus, I claim that there is no simple relationship between causal dependence and causal laws of the sort often pictured. Rather, this paper explores the complexity of the relationship in a certain well-understood case.

1 Introduction

2 The Causal Covering-Law Thesis

3 The Laws of String Motion

4 Green's Functions and Causation

5 Green's Functions and Boundary Conditions

6 The Green's Function as a Violation of the Wave Equation

6.1 The Green's Function and other Senses of ‘Causal Law’: Temporal Propagation and Local Propagation

7 The Distributional Wave Equation

8 Why is not the Green's Function a ‘Causal Law’?

9 Conclusion

Inductive Influence

Williamson, J. — 2007-11-22

Objective Bayesianism has been criticised for not allowing learning from experience: it is claimed that an agent must give degree of belief $$\frac{1}{2}$$ to the next raven being black, however many other black ravens have been observed. I argue that this objection can be overcome by appealing to objective Bayesian nets, a formalism for representing objective Bayesian degrees of belief. Under this account, previous observations exert an inductive influence on the next observation. I show how this approach can be used to capture the Johnson–Carnap continuum of inductive methods, as well as the Nix–Paris continuum, and show how inductive influence can be measured.

1 Introduction

2 The Problem

3 Diagnosis

4 Objective Bayesian Nets

5 Resolution

6 The Johnson–Carnap Continuum

7 The Nix–Paris Continuum

8 Linguistic Slack

9 Frequencies and Degrees of Belief

10 Conclusion

Bayes not Bust! Why Simplicity is no Problem for Bayesians

Dowe, D. L., Gardner, S., Oppy, G. — 2007-11-22

The advent of formal definitions of the simplicity of a theory has important implications for model selection. But what is the best way to define simplicity? Forster and Sober ([1994]) advocate the use of Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC), a non-Bayesian formalisation of the notion of simplicity. This forms an important part of their wider attack on Bayesianism in the philosophy of science. We defend a Bayesian alternative: the simplicity of a theory is to be characterised in terms of Wallace's Minimum Message Length (MML). We show that AIC is inadequate for many statistical problems where MML performs well. Whereas MML is always defined, AIC can be undefined. Whereas MML is not known ever to be statistically inconsistent, AIC can be. Even when defined and consistent, AIC performs worse than MML on small sample sizes. MML is statistically invariant under 1-to-1 re-parametrisation, thus avoiding a common criticism of Bayesian approaches. We also show that MML provides answers to many of Forster's objections to Bayesianism. Hence an important part of the attack on Bayesianism fails.

Introduction

The Curve Fitting Problem

2.1 Curves and families of curves

2.2 Noise

2.3 The method of Maximum Likelihood

2.4 ML and over-fitting

Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC)

The Predictive Accuracy Framework

The Minimum Message Length (MML) Principle

5.1 The Strict MML estimator

5.2 An example: The binomial distribution

5.3 Properties of the SMML estimator

5.3.1 Bayesianism

5.3.2 Language invariance

5.3.3Generality

5.3.4 Consistency and efficiency

5.4 Similarity to false oracles

5.5 Approximations to SMML

Criticisms of AIC

6.1 Problems with ML

6.1.1 Small sample bias in a Gaussian distribution

6.1.2 The von Mises circular and von Mises—Fisher spherical distributions

6.1.3 The Neyman–Scott problem

6.1.4 Neyman–Scott, predictive accuracy and minimum expected KL distance

6.2 Other problems with AIC

6.2.1 Univariate polynomial regression

6.2.2 Autoregressive econometric time series

6.2.3 Multivariate second-order polynomial model selection

6.2.4 Gap or no gap: a clustering-like problem for AIC

6.3 Conclusions from the comparison of MML and AIC

Meeting Forster's objections to Bayesianism

7.1 The sub-family problem

7.2 The problem of approximation, or, which framework for statistics?

Conclusion

Details of the derivation of the Strict MML estimator

MML, AIC and the Gap vs. No Gap Problem

B.1 Expected size of the largest gap

B.2 Performance of AIC on the gap vs. no gap problem

B.3 Performance of MML in the gap vs. no gap problem

Chinese Rooms and Program Portability

Sprevak, M. D. — 2007-11-22

I argue in this article that there is a mistake in Searle's Chinese room argument that has not received sufficient attention. The mistake stems from Searle's use of the Church–Turing thesis. Searle assumes that the Church–Turing thesis licences the assumption that the Chinese room can run any program. I argue that it does not, and that this assumption is false. A number of possible objections are considered and rejected. My conclusion is that it is consistent with Searle's argument to hold onto the claim that understanding consists in the running of a program.

1 Searle's Argument

1.1 The Church–Turing thesis

2 Criticism of Searle's Argument

3 Objections and Replies

3.1 The virtual brain machine objection

3.2 The brain-based objection

3.3 The syntax/physics objection

3.4 The abstraction objection

3.5 The ‘same conclusion’ objection

3.6 The ‘unnecessary baggage’ objection

3.7 The Chinese gym objection

3.8 The syntax/semantics objection

3.9 Turing's definition of algorithm

3.9.1 Consequences

3.9.2 Criticism of the defence

4 Conclusion

Sklar's Maneuver

Skow, B. — 2007-11-22

Sklar ([1974]) claimed that relationalism about ontology—the doctrine that space and time do not exist—is compatible with Newtonian mechanics. To defend this claim he sketched a relationalist interpretation of Newtonian mechanics. In his interpretation, absolute acceleration is a fundamental, intrinsic property of material bodies; that a body undergoes absolute acceleration does not entail that space and time exist. But Sklar left his proposal as just a sketch; his defense of relationalism succeeds only if the sketch can be filled in. I argue that this cannot be done. There can be no (relationalist) dynamical laws of motion based on Sklar's proposal that capture the content of Newton's theory. So relationalists must look elsewhere for a relationalist interpretation of Newtonian mechanics.

1 Introduction

2 The Relationalist Initial Value Problem

3 Sklar's Maneuver

4 Sklar's Initial Value Problem is not Well-posed

5 Concluding Remarks

Empty Waves in Bohmian Quantum Mechanics

Lewis, P. J. — 2007-11-22

There is a recurring line of argument in the literature to the effect that Bohm's theory fails to solve the measurement problem. I show that this argument fails in all its variants. Hence Bohm's theory, whatever its drawbacks, at least succeeds in solving the measurement problem. I briefly discuss a similar argument that has been raised against the GRW theory.

1 Introduction

2 Three Theories

3 The Basic Argument

4 Branches and Worlds

5 Theory and Interpretation

6 Size Matters

7 Conclusion

Stochastic Einstein Locality Revisited

Butterfield, J. — 2007-11-22

I discuss various formulations of stochastic Einstein locality (SEL), which is a version of the idea of relativistic causality, that is, the idea that influences propagate at most as fast as light. SEL is similar to Reichenbach's Principle of the Common Cause (PCC), and Bell's Local Causality.

My main aim is to discuss formulations of SEL for a fixed background spacetime. I previously argued that SEL is violated by the outcome dependence shown by Bell correlations, both in quantum mechanics and in quantum field theory. Here I reassess those verdicts in the light of some recent literature which argues that outcome dependence does not violate the PCC. I argue that the verdicts about SEL still stand.

Finally, I briefly discuss how to formulate relativistic causality if there is no fixed background spacetime.

1 Introduction

2 Formulating Stochastic Einstein Locality

2.1 Events and regions

2.2 The idea of SEL

2.3 Three formulations of SEL

2.3.1 The formulations

2.3.2 Comparisons

2.4 Implications between the formulations

2.4.1 Conditions for the equivalence of SELD1 and SELD2

2.4.2 Conditions for the equivalence of SELS and SELD2

3 Relativistic Causality in the Bell Experiment

3.1 The background

3.1.1 The Bell experiment reviewed

3.1.2 My previous position

3.2 A common common cause? The Budapest school

3.2.1 Resuscitating the PCC

3.2.2 Known proofs of a Bell inequality need a strong PCC

3.2.3 Two distinctions

3.2.4 Szabó's model

3.2.5 A common common cause is plausible

3.2.6 Bell inequalities from a weak PCC: the Bern school

3.3 SEL in the Bell experiment

3.3.1 PCC and SEL are connected by PPSI

3.3.2 The need for other judgments

3.3.3 Weak vs. strong SELD

4 SEL in Algebraic Quantum Field Theory

4.1 The story so far

4.2 Questions

4.2.1 Our formulations

4.2.2 The Budapest and Bern schools

5 SEL in Dynamical Spacetimes

5.1 SEL for metric structure?

5.2 SEL for causal sets?

5.2.1 The causal set approach

5.2.2 Labelled causal sets; general covariance

5.2.3 Deducing the dynamics

5.2.4 The fate of SEL

Phil Dowe And Paul Noordhof * Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World

Schaffer, J. — 2007-11-22

1 Summaries

2 Reflections