The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science - recent issues

Relational Quantum Mechanics and the Determinacy Problem

Brown, M. J. — Fri, 20 Nov 2009 08:50:24 PST

Carlo Rovelli's relational interpretation of quantum mechanics holds that a system's states or the values of its physical quantities as normally conceived only exist relative to a cut between a system and an observer or measuring instrument. Furthermore, on Rovelli's account, the appearance of determinate observations from pure quantum superpositions happens only relative to the interaction of the system and observer. Jeffrey Barrett ([1999]) has pointed out that certain relational interpretations suffer from what we might call the ‘determinacy problem', but Barrett misclassifies Rovelli's interpretation by lumping it in with Mermin's view, as Rovelli's view is quite different and has resources to escape the particular criticisms that Barrett makes of Mermin's view. Rovelli's interpretation still leaves us with a paradox having to do with the determinacy of measurement outcomes, which can be accepted only if we are willing to give up on certain elements of the ‘absolute’ view of the world.

Introduction

Relational Quantum Mechanics

Barrett on Relational Interpretations

A Puzzle about Relative States

Canonical Cuts

Is Quantum Consistency Enough?

Perfect Symmetries

Healey, R. — Fri, 20 Nov 2009 08:50:24 PST

While empirical symmetries relate situations, theoretical symmetries relate models of a theory we use to represent them. An empirical symmetry is perfect if and only if any two situations it relates share all intrinsic properties. Sometimes one can use a theory to explain an empirical symmetry by showing how it follows from a corresponding theoretical symmetry. The theory then reveals a perfect symmetry. I say what this involves and why it matters, beginning with a puzzle that is resolved by the subsequent analysis. I conclude by pointing to applications and implications of the ideas developed earlier in the paper.

Introduction

Is Faraday in the Same Boat as Galileo?

Empirical Symmetries

Theoretical Symmetries

Explaining Empirical Symmetries

Conclusion

Appendix A

Appendix B

Are Linguists Better Subjects?

Culbertson, J., Gross, S. — Fri, 20 Nov 2009 08:50:24 PST

Who are the best subjects for judgment tasks intended to test grammatical hypotheses? Michael Devitt ([2006a], [2006b]) argues, on the basis of a hypothesis concerning the psychology of such judgments, that linguists themselves are. We present empirical evidence suggesting that the relevant divide is not between linguists and non-linguists, but between subjects with and without minimally sufficient task-specific knowledge. In particular, we show that subjects with at least some minimal exposure to or knowledge of such tasks tend to perform consistently with one another—greater knowledge of linguistics makes no further difference—while at the same time exhibiting markedly greater in-group consistency than those who have no previous exposure to or knowledge of such tasks and their goals.

Introduction

Background and Clarification

Previous Experiments

Our Experiment

The Context of Devitt's Claim and His Psychological Model

Appendix

Physical Causation and Difference-Making

Ney, A. — Fri, 20 Nov 2009 08:50:24 PST

This paper examines the relationship between physical theories of causation and theories of difference-making. It is plausible to think that such theories are compatible with one another as they are aimed at different targets: the former, an empirical account of actual causal relations; the latter, an account that will capture the truth of most of our ordinary causal claims. The question then becomes: what is the relationship between physical causation and difference-making? Is one kind of causal fact more fundamental than the other? This paper defends causal foundationalism: the view that facts about difference-making are dependent on the obtaining of facts about physical causation. However, the paper's main goal is to clarify the structure of the debate. At the end of the paper, it is shown how settling the issue about the relationship between physical theories of causation and theories of difference-making has more than mere intrinsic interest in unifying the very different pursuits that have been undertaken in the philosophy of causation. It can help to break a stalemate that has arisen in the current debate about mental causation.

Two Pursuits in the Philosophy of Causation

Causal Foundationalism and its Rivals

Anti-foundationalism: Russell and Field

Against the Russell/Field Arguments

The Case for Foundationalism

Causing and ‘Causing’

An Application: Mental Causation

SAD Computers and Two Versions of the Church-Turing Thesis

Button, T. — Fri, 20 Nov 2009 08:50:24 PST

Recent work on hypercomputation has raised new objections against the Church–Turing Thesis. In this paper, I focus on the challenge posed by a particular kind of hypercomputer, namely, SAD computers. I first consider deterministic and probabilistic barriers to the physical possibility of SAD computation. These suggest several ways to defend a Physical version of the Church–Turing Thesis. I then argue against Hogarth's analogy between non-Turing computability and non-Euclidean geometry, showing that it is a non-sequitur. I conclude that the Effective version of the Church–Turing Thesis is unaffected by SAD computation.

SAD Computability

1.1 The basic idea of SAD computation

1.2 Avoiding supertasks

1.3 Davies's model of SAD computation

1.4 Hogarth's model of SAD computation

1.5 Generalizing SAD computers

Physical Computability

2.1 The Physical Church–Turing Thesis

2.2 Deterministic barriers to physical computation

2.3 Probabilistic barriers to physical computation

Effective Computability

3.1 The Effective Church–Turing Thesis

3.2 Hogarth's challenge to the Effective Church–Turing Thesis

3.3 Arguing from SAD computability is a non-sequitur

3.4 SAD computability is built from finitary computability

Concluding Remarks

Commutativity or Holism? A Dilemma for Conditionalizers

Weisberg, J. — Fri, 20 Nov 2009 08:50:24 PST

Conditionalization and Jeffrey Conditionalization cannot simultaneously satisfy two widely held desiderata on rules for empirical learning. The first desideratum is confirmational holism, which says that the evidential import of an experience is always sensitive to our background assumptions. The second desideratum is commutativity, which says that the order in which one acquires evidence shouldn't affect what conclusions one draws, provided the same total evidence is gathered in the end. (Jeffrey) Conditionalization cannot satisfy either of these desiderata without violating the other. This is a surprising problem, and I offer a diagnosis of its source. I argue that (Jeffrey) Conditionalization is inherently anti-holistic in a way that is just exacerbated by the requirement of commutativity. The dilemma is thus a superficial manifestation of (Jeffrey) Conditionalization's fundamentally anti-holistic nature.

1 Introduction

2 Clarifying Commutativity and Holism

3 The Dilemma for Strict Conditionalization

4 The Dilemma for Jeffrey Conditionalization

4.1 Jeffrey conditionalization and commutativity

4.2 The tension with holism

4.3 Loose ends and technical worries

5 Diagnosis

6 Morals and Connections

An Organizational Account of Biological Functions

Mossio, M., Saborido, C., Moreno, A. — Fri, 20 Nov 2009 08:50:24 PST

In this paper, we develop an organizational account that defines biological functions as causal relations subject to closure in living systems, interpreted as the most typical example of organizationally closed and differentiated self-maintaining systems. We argue that this account adequately grounds the teleological and normative dimensions of functions in the current organization of a system, insofar as it provides an explanation for the existence of the function bearer and, at the same time, identifies in a non-arbitrary way the norms that functions are supposed to obey. Accordingly, we suggest that the organizational account combines the etiological and dispositional perspectives in an integrated theoretical framework.

Introduction

Dispositional Approaches

Etiological Theories

Biological Self-maintenance

4.1 Closure, teleology, and normativity

4.2 Organizational differentiation

Functions

5.1 C₁: Contributing to the maintenance of the organization

5.2 C₂: Producing the functional trait

Implications and Objections

6.1 Functional versus useful

6.2 Dysfunctions, side effects, and accidental contributions

6.3 Proper functions and selected effects

6.4 Reproduction

6.5 Relation with other ‘unitarian’ approaches

Conclusions

HANNE ANDERSEN, PETER BARKER and XIAN CHEN The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions

Thagard, P. — Fri, 20 Nov 2009 08:50:24 PST

JON WILLIAMSON Bayesian Nets and Causality

Glymour, C. — Fri, 20 Nov 2009 08:50:24 PST

Response to Glymour

Williamson, J. — Fri, 20 Nov 2009 08:50:24 PST

'The Most Sacred Tenet'? Causal Reasoning in Physics

Frisch, M. — Tue, 11 Aug 2009 08:26:11 PDT

According to a view widely held among philosophers of science, the notion of cause has no legitimate role to play in mature theories of physics. In this paper I investigate the role of what physicists themselves identify as causal principles in the derivation of dispersion relations. I argue that this case study constitutes a counterexample to the popular view and that causal principles can function as genuine factual constraints.

Introduction

Causality and Dispersion Relations

Norton's Skepticism

Conclusion

Is There an Independent Principle of Causality in Physics?

Norton, J. D. — Tue, 11 Aug 2009 08:26:11 PDT

Mathias Frisch has argued that the requirement that electromagnetic dispersion processes are causal adds empirical content not found in electrodynamic theory. I urge that this attempt to reconstitute a local principle of causality in physics fails. An independent principle is not needed to recover the results of dispersion theory. The use of ‘causality conditions’ proves to be the mere adding of causal labels to an already presumed fact. If instead one seeks a broader, independently formulated grounding for the conditions, that grounding either fails or dissolves into vagueness and ambiguity, as has traditionally been the fate of candidate principles of causality.

Introduction

Scattering in Classical Electrodynamics

Sufficiency of the Physics

Failure of the Principle of Causality Proposed

4.1 A sometimes principle

4.2 The conditions of applicability are obscure

4.3 Effects can come before their causes

4.4 Vagueness of the relata and of the notion of causal process

Conclusion

Causality and Dispersion: A Reply to John Norton

Frisch, M. — Tue, 11 Aug 2009 08:26:11 PDT

Classical dispersion relations are derived from a time-asymmetric constraint. I argue that the standard causal interpretation of this constraint plays a scientifically legitimate role in dispersion theory, and hence provides a counterexample to the causal skepticism advanced by John Norton and others. Norton ([2009]) argues that the causal interpretation of the time-asymmetric constraint is an empty honorific and that the constraint can be motivated by purely non-causal considerations. In this paper I respond to Norton's criticisms and argue that Norton's skepticism derives its force partly by holding causal principles to a standard too high to be met by other scientifically legitimate constraints.

Introduction

Non-causal Foundations?

Other Grounds for Skepticism

The Principle of Energy Conservation

A Difference That Makes a Difference: Passing through Dennett's Stalinesque/Orwellian Impasse

Todd, S. J. — Tue, 11 Aug 2009 08:26:11 PDT

Dennett and Kinsbourne ([1992]) argue that metacontrast backward visual masking provides a clear illustration that ‘there is really only a verbal difference’ between two versions of the Cartesian Theater model of the mind. This alleged lack of a distinction is both the crucial premise of their main argument against the Cartesian Theater and a motivator for accepting their own Multiple Drafts model. I argue that metacontrast reveals a difference between the two versions of the Cartesian Theater that meets criteria found in (Dennett and Kinsbourne [1992]) for determining such a difference. This difference undermines the soundness of their argument against the Cartesian Theater, and exerts pressure on Dennett and Kinsbourne to offer a more detailed articulation of their model.

Introduction

Brief Explanation of Metacontrast Backward Visual Masking

The Stalinesque and Orwellian Models of Metacontrast

3.1 Criteria for determining a difference

A Difference That Makes a Difference

4.1 Skeptical hypothesis objection

Other Objections and Replies

5.1 Straw person objection

5.2 Corroborative issues objection

Conclusion

An Explication of the Causal Dimension of Drift

Gildenhuys, P. — Tue, 11 Aug 2009 08:26:11 PDT

Among philosophers, controversy over the notion of drift in population genetics is ongoing. This is at least partly because the notion of drift has an ambiguous usage among population geneticists. My goal in this paper is to explicate the causal dimension of drift, to say what causal influences are responsible for the stochasticity in population genetics models. It is commonplace for population genetics to oppose the influence of selection to that of drift, and to consider how the dynamics of populations are altered when each has greater or lesser influence. I define the causes that are referred to as drift when researchers speak this way.

Introduction

Populations and Variant Types

The Cause–Effect Ambiguity of Drift

Non-directional Factors in Population Genetics

How N_ev Is Used in Population Genetics

Causal Conceptions of Drift

6.1 The Millstein/Beatty conception of drift

6.2 Rosenberg and Bouchard: Drift as initial conditions

NINPICs

7.1 Why drift is instituted by NINPICs

7.2 How NINPICS work

7.3 NINPICs and random sampling

7.4 Independent sampling and effective population size

7.5 Variance in progeny number

7.6 Population effects of NINPICs

NINPICs and the Stochastic Character of Selection Theory

Conclusion

Appendix

Time Reversal in Classical Electromagnetism

Arntzenius, F., Greaves, H. — Tue, 11 Aug 2009 08:26:12 PDT

Richard Feynman has claimed that anti-particles are nothing but particles ‘propagating backwards in time’; that time reversing a particle state always turns it into the corresponding anti-particle state. According to standard quantum field theory textbooks this is not so: time reversal does not turn particles into anti-particles. Feynman's view is interesting because, in particular, it suggests a non-standard, and possibly illuminating, interpretation of the CPT theorem. This paper explores a classical analog of Feynman's view, in the context of the recent debate between David Albert and David Malament over time reversal in classical electromagnetism.

Introduction

Time Reversal and the Direction of Time

Classical Electromagnetism: The Story So Far

3.1 The standard textbook view

3.2 Albert's proposal

3.3 Malament's proposal

3.4 Albert revisited

The ‘Feynman’ Proposal

Structuralism: A Third Way?

5.1 Structures: the debate recast

5.2 Relational structures

5.3 Malament and Feynman structures as conventional representors of a relational reality

Conclusions and Open Questions

Against Field Interpretations of Quantum Field Theory

Baker, D. J. — Tue, 11 Aug 2009 08:26:12 PDT

I examine some problems standing in the way of a successful `field interpretation' of quantum field theory. The most popular extant proposal depends on the Hilbert space of `wavefunctionals.' But since wavefunctional space is unitarily equivalent to many-particle Fock space, two of the most powerful arguments against particle interpretations also undermine this form of field interpretation.

Introduction

Field Interpretations and Field Operators

The Wavefunctional Interpretation

Fields and Inequivalent Representations

4.1 The Rindler representation

4.2 Spontaneous symmetry breaking

4.3 Coherent representations

The Fate of Fields in Interacting QFT

Conclusions

Mathematical Explanation in Science

Baker, A. — Tue, 11 Aug 2009 08:26:12 PDT

Does mathematics ever play an explanatory role in science? If so then this opens the way for scientific realists to argue for the existence of mathematical entities using inference to the best explanation. Elsewhere I have argued, using a case study involving the prime-numbered life cycles of periodical cicadas, that there are examples of indispensable mathematical explanations of purely physical phenomena. In this paper I respond to objections to this claim that have been made by various philosophers, and I discuss potential future directions of research for each side in the debate over the existence of abstract mathematical objects.

Introduction: Mathematical Explanation

Indispensability and Explanation

Is the Mathematics Indispensable to the Explanation?

3.1 Object-level arbitrariness

3.2 Concept-level arbitrariness

3.3 Theory-level arbitrariness

Is the Explanandum ‘Purely Physical’?

Is the Mathematics Explanatory in Its Own Right?

Does Inference to the Best Explanation Apply to Mathematics?

6.1 Leng's first argument

6.2 Leng's second argument

6.3 Leng's third argument

Conclusions

Chasing Chimeras

Myrvold, W. C. — Tue, 11 Aug 2009 08:26:12 PDT

Earman and Ruetsche ([2005]) have cast their gaze upon existing no-go theorems for relativistic modal interpretations, and have found them inconclusive. They suggest that it would be more fruitful to investigate modal interpretations proposed for ‘really relativistic theories,’ that is, algebraic relativistic quantum field theories. They investigate the proposal of (Clifton [2000]), and extend Clifton's result that, for a host of states, his proposal yields no definite observables other than multiples of the identity. This leads Earman and Ruetsche to a suspicion that troubles for modal interpretations of such relativistic theories ‘are due less to the Poincaré invariance of relativistic QFT vs. the Galilean invariance of ordinary nonrelativistic QM than to the infinite number of degrees of freedom of former vs. the finite number of degrees of freedom of the latter’ (pp. 577–8). I am skeptical of this suggestion. Though there are troubles for modal interpretations of relativistic quantum field theory that are due to its being a field theory—that is, due to infinitude of the degrees of freedom—they are not the only troubles faced by modal interpretations of quantum theories set in relativistic spacetime; there are also troubles traceable to relativistic causal structure.

Introduction

Relativity and Causal Structure

The Theorems Purified

Evolving States in a Relativistic Context

Does Functional Reduction Need Bridge Laws? A Response to Marras

Morris, K. — Tue, 11 Aug 2009 08:26:12 PDT

In his recent article ‘Consciousness and Reduction’, Ausonio Marras argues that functional reduction must appeal to bridge laws and thus does not represent a genuine alternative to Nagelian reduction. In response, I first argue that even if functional reduction must use bridge laws, it still represents a genuine alternative to Nagelian reduction. Further, I argue that Marras does not succeed in showing that functional reduction must use bridge laws.

Introduction

Nagelian Reduction, Functional Reduction, and Bridge Laws

Marras on Functional Reduction

The Logical Space of ‘Bridge Law’ Views of Reduction

[RP] as an Account of Realization

Conclusion

PHILIP MIROWSKI The Effortless Economy of Science?

Ross, D. — Tue, 11 Aug 2009 08:26:12 PDT

EVA JABLONBKA AND MARION J. LAMB Evolution in Four Dimensions: Genetic, Epigenetic, Behavioral and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life

Grose, J. — Tue, 11 Aug 2009 08:26:12 PDT

DOMINIC MURPHY Psychiatry in the Scientific Image

Brown, R. — Tue, 11 Aug 2009 08:26:12 PDT

Which Abstraction Principles are Acceptable? Some Limitative Results

Linnebo, O., Uzquiano, G. — Wed, 20 May 2009 10:45:01 PDT

Neo-Fregean logicism attempts to base mathematics on abstraction principles. Since not all abstraction principles are acceptable, the neo-Fregeans need an account of which ones are. One of the most promising accounts is in terms of the notion of stability; roughly, that an abstraction principle is acceptable just in case it is satisfiable in all domains of sufficiently large cardinality. We present two counterexamples to stability as a sufficient condition for acceptability and argue that these counterexamples can be avoided only by major departures from the existing neo-Fregean programme.

Introduction

A Simple Counterexample

A Fregean Counterexample

The Argument

4.1 Defending step 1

4.2 Defending step 2

4.3 Defending step 3

4.4 Defending step 4

Concluding Remarks

Scientific Realism, the Atomic Theory, and the Catch-All Hypothesis: Can We Test Fundamental Theories Against All Serious Alternatives?

Stanford, P. K. — Wed, 20 May 2009 10:45:01 PDT

Sherri Roush ([2005]) and I ([2001], [2006]) have each argued independently that the most significant challenge to scientific realism arises from our inability to consider the full range of serious alternatives to a given hypothesis we seek to test, but we diverge significantly concerning the range of cases in which this problem becomes acute. Here I argue against Roush's further suggestion that the atomic hypothesis represents a case in which scientific ingenuity has enabled us to overcome the problem, showing how her general strategy is undermined by evidence I have already offered in support of what I have called the ‘problem of unconceived alternatives’. I then go on to show why her strategy will not generally (if ever) allow us to formulate and test exhaustive spaces of hypotheses in cases of fundamental scientific theorizing.

Roush, Stanford, and Unconceived Alternatives

Perrin and Brownian Motion

Retention and Possible Alternatives: New Lessons from Some Familiar History

Whither Exhaustion?

Conclusion

Scientific Understanding and Synthetic Design

Goodwin, W. — Wed, 20 May 2009 10:45:01 PDT

One of the indisputable signs of the progress made in organic chemistry over the last two hundred years is the increased ability of chemists to manipulate, control, and design chemical reactions. The technological expertise manifest in contemporary synthetic organic chemistry is, at least in part, due to developments in the theory of organic chemistry. By appealing to a notable chemist's attempts to articulate and codify the heuristics of synthetic design, this paper investigates how understanding theoretical organic chemistry facilitates progress in synthetic organic chemistry. The picture that emerges of how the applications of organic chemistry are grounded in its theory is contrasted with both standard and some more contemporary philosophical accounts of the applications of science.

1 Introduction

2 Total Synthesis as Applied Science

3 Understanding Organic Chemistry

4 The Heuristics of Synthetic Design

5 An Example: Longifolene

6 Conclusion

How Science Textbooks Treat Scientific Method: A Philosopher's Perspective

Blachowicz, J. — Wed, 20 May 2009 10:45:01 PDT

This paper examines, from the point of view of a philosopher of science, what it is that introductory science textbooks say and do not say about ‘scientific method’. Seventy introductory texts in a variety of natural and social sciences provided the material for this study. The inadequacy of these textbook accounts is apparent in three general areas: (a) the simple empiricist view of science that tends to predominate; (b) the demarcation between scientific and non-scientific inquiry and (c) the avoidance of controversy—in part the consequence of the tendency toward textbook standardization. Most importantly, this study provides some evidence of the gulf that separates philosophy of science from science instruction, and examines some important aspects of the demarcation between science and non-science—an important issue for philosophers, scientists, and science educators.

1 Scientific Method in Science Textbooks

1.1 Textbook selection

1.2 Topic frequency

Part I: Preliminaries

2 Science versus Non-science

2.1 Subjective experience/bias

2.2 Too many unmeasurable variables

2.3 Non-phenomenal objects

2.4 Falsifiability

3 Scientific Method in Everyday Activities?

4 When Did Science Begin?

4.1 Greek science?

4.2 Seventeenth-century origins

Part II: Components

5 Formal Logic

5.1 Deduction: ‘if–then reasoning’

5.2 Induction

6 Hypotheses, Theories, Laws, Models

6.1 Description and explanation

6.2 Models

6.3 ‘Only a theory’

6.4 Simplicity

Part III: Dynamics

7 The Generation of Hypotheses

8 The Testing of Hypotheses

8.1 Proof/verification/confirmation

8.2 Why is confirmation inconclusive?

8.2.1 Inductive generalization

8.2.2 Alternative hypotheses and the hypothetico-deductive method

8.3 Disproof/falsification

8.4 Why is falsification inconclusive?

8.4.1 Saving a hypothesis through ad hoc exceptions

8.4.2 Revising/correcting a hypothesis

9 Experimental Controls and the ‘Broken Lamp’

10 Conclusion

10.1 Different sciences, different concerns

10.2 Simple empiricism

10.3 The demarcation question

10.4 Textbook standardization and the avoidance of controversy

Explanationist Aid for the Theory of Inductive Logic

Huemer, M. — Wed, 20 May 2009 10:45:01 PDT

A central problem facing a probabilistic approach to the problem of induction is the difficulty of sufficiently constraining prior probabilities so as to yield the conclusion that induction is cogent. The Principle of Indifference, according to which alternatives are equiprobable when one has no grounds for preferring one over another, represents one way of addressing this problem; however, the Principle faces the well-known problem that multiple interpretations of it are possible, leading to incompatible conclusions. I propose a partial solution to the latter problem, drawing on the notion of explanatory priority. The resulting synthesis of Bayesian and inference-to-best-explanation approaches affords a principled defense of prior probability distributions that support induction.

A Probabilistic Formulation of the Problem of Induction

A Problem with Objective Bayesianism

2.1 Intuitive motivation for the Principle of Indifference

2.2 The inconsistency objection

2.3 An effort to contain the problem

Explanationist Relief for Objective Bayesianism

3.1 Explanation and explanatory priority

3.2 Explanatory priority and the assignment of priors

3.3 In defense of Laplace

3.4 The metaphysics of the explanationist defense: causation and laws

3.5 Inference to the best explanation?

Problems and objections

4.1 Unknown explanatory possibilities

4.2 Empirical reasoning about explanatory priority

4.3 The probability of deterministic laws

4.4 Changing chances

4.5 Scruples concerning a priori probability

Cognitive Maps and the Language of Thought

Rescorla, M. — Wed, 20 May 2009 10:45:01 PDT

Fodor advocates a view of cognitive processes as computations defined over the language of thought (or Mentalese). Even among those who endorse Mentalese, considerable controversy surrounds its representational format. What semantically relevant structure should scientific psychology attribute to Mentalese symbols? Researchers commonly emphasize logical structure, akin to that displayed by predicate calculus sentences. To counteract this tendency, I discuss computational models of navigation drawn from probabilistic robotics. These models involve computations defined over cognitive maps, which have geometric rather than logical structure. They thereby demonstrate the possibility of rational cognitive processes in an exclusively non-logical representational medium. Furthermore, they offer much promise for the empirical study of animal navigation.

Mental Representations

Mental Imagery, Perception, and Cognitive Maps

Cognitive Maps in Psychology

Cognitive Maps in Robotics

Cognitive Maps in the Strict Sense?

Logically Structured Representations?

Systematicity and Productivity

Consequences for Philosophy and Psychology

Appendix: Cartographic Semantics

Gene Names as Proper Names of Individuals: An Assessment

Reydon, T. A. C. — Wed, 20 May 2009 10:45:01 PDT

According to a recent suggestion, the names of gene taxa should be conceived of as referring to individuals with concrete genes as their parts, just as the names of biological species are often understood as denoting individuals with organisms as their parts. Although prima facie this suggestion might advance the debate on gene concepts in a similar way as the species-are-individuals thesis advanced the debate on species concepts, I argue that the principal arguments in support of the gene-individuality thesis are much less compelling than the parallel arguments in the species case. In addition, I argue that the notion of biological function invoked in the gene-individuality thesis (selected effect) is not the one that biologists actually use when individuating genes. Contra the gene-individuality thesis, I argue that gene names refer to kinds, defined primarily (though not exclusively) by causal-role functions.

1 Introduction

2 Species as Individuals: The Two Main Arguments

3 Gene-Lineages as Individuals: Rosenberg's Argumentation

4 Assessing the GAI-Thesis

4.1 Metaphysics: What biology tells us about lineages

4.2 Epistemology: How biologists individuate the parts of genomes

5 What Do Gene Names Refer To?

6 Why the GAI-thesis Won't Solve the Gene Problem

VINCENT F. HENDRICKS Mainstream and Formal Epistemology

Priest, G. — Wed, 20 May 2009 10:45:01 PDT

ROBIN LE POIDEVIN The Images of Time: An Essay on Temporal Representation

Phillips, I. B. — Wed, 20 May 2009 10:45:01 PDT

C. S. BERTUGLIA AND F. VAIO Nonlinearity, Chaos, and Complexity

Strevens, M. — Wed, 20 May 2009 10:45:01 PDT

JOHN FOSTER The Divine Lawmaker

Beebee, H. — Wed, 20 May 2009 10:45:01 PDT